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Abstract
The thesis is formed of three chapters on quite
unrelated problems. The first essay is an empirical investi-
gation of what has been termed the short-run productivity
puzzle namely, the procyclical movement of labor producti-
vity with respect to output. The U.S. economy is analyzed both
in the aggregate and at a sectoral level. It is shown that the
common finding that relates the paradoxical behavior of labor
productivity to the presence of short run increasing returns is
due to incorrect estimation techniques. When care is taken of
this econometric shortcoming, increasing returns to labor are
not any more detected. This chapter contains an appendix inves-
tigating the relation between real wages, employment and output.
The common finding is a positive relation between real wages and
employment. This appendix shows how such an outcome may be due
to the presence of specification error bias and to the use of
an incorrect price deflator.
The second chapter considers various aspects of the
theory of devaluation. It contains a discussion of the monetarist
model where it is shown that the conditions under which a devalua-
tion improves the balance of payments of the devaluing country are
more stringent than what used to be thought. It shows that the
differences between the absorption, the elasticities and the mone-
tarist models lie not in the more or less explicit consideration_
given to the demand and supply elasticities on the goods markets
but in the different underlying description of the assets markets,
namely the monetarist and the absorption models rely on flow asset
equilibrium, while the classical elasticities model can be reinter-
preted and justified when the assets markets are assumed to be in
stock equilibrium. This chapter finally contains a discussion of
a two countries, two goods, two assets model when interest payments
on foreign debt are explicitly taken into account in the definition
of disposable income.
iii
The last chapter is concerned with the tradeoff between
short run stabilization policies and long run plans. A planner tries
to control a short run economy characterized by variable unemployment
rates. The benchmark path is an optimal full employment growth path
reflecting the planner's preferences. It is shown that if the planner
implements the policies suggested by short run optimization, the long run
path will never be reached. On the other hand, if policies that are
optimal from a long run point of view are actually enforced on the
short run economy, this will not be destabilized in a finite time and
the optimal growth path will be achieved.
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Chapter 1
This paper investigates the relation between output and employ-
ment in the context of a short run production function. This is
certainly not a new problem so that interest in it can be motivated
only by the quite different conclusions reached in this instance.
With respect to the question of what is the value of the elasticity of
output with respect to employment, there seems to be a striking
unanimity in previous empirical results, in the sense of pointing to
the existence of generalized marginal increasing returns to labor. As
Solow observed: "When output stagnates or falls away from a peak,
productivity (output per man-hour) tends to fall, or to rise slower
than trend; when output recovers, productivity rises faster than
trend.... The crude observations seem, therefore, to contradict dimin-
ishing returns to labor in the short run. When increased employment
works on a given stock of capital goods, output per man-hour "ought"
to fall."'  It should be added that some evidence contradicts the
existence of diminishing returns to labor in the long run also.
This puzzling evidence was quite welcome by those who never
trusted the realism of the neoclassical apparatus. So that it is
probably not an understanding to say that this type of result
inspired both theoretical considerations on "The Irrelevance of
Equilibrium Economics"2 and empirical statements, generally expressed
This paper owes much to the helpful comments made by J. Hausman and R.
M. Solow. As the reader will easily realize by himself, a good deal of
the contentions that will follow are based on previous work by the men-
tioned people. So that little is left to the author but the recognition
of the full responsibility for the errors.
The CENTRO ALBERTO BENEDUCE is gratefully acknowledged for financial
assistance.
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in form of laws, namely the Kaldor-Berdoorm Law 3 asserting the existence
of increasing returns to labor in the short run.
In what follows it will be argued that such estimates of the
labor productivity coefficient are biased in the upward direction,
the source of the bias being a specification error.
The next section will be a brief survey of the empirical results
obtained by other researchers. The third section will be devoted to
the exposition of an alternative set of results based on a model recently
explored by Nordhaus. The relation of real wages output and employment
will then be investigated.
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2. Survey of the Literature
The relation between employment and output has been studied
from two apparently different standpoints. When it is interpreted as a
structtral relation involving the long-run determinants of labor
productivity, explanations usually center on facts like changes in
personal efficiency of workers, capital -labor substitution, technical
progress accruing through gross investment, economies of scale and
increasing returns depending on the extent of the market.5  On the
other hand, when what is looked for are explanations of the cyclical
behavior of labor productivity, the emphasis goes to short-run
phenomena such as adjustment costs, capital utilization rates and overhead
labor.
Unfortunately, given the lack of data on most of these variables
such a variety of interpretations is not accompanied by an equal variety
of estimated regressions, so that it is quite hard to distinguish short
from long run. 6 For someone who claims that the previous estimates
of labor productivity are biased, a good question to be asked is then,
"biased with respect to what?" The answer is that at least with respect
to the direction of the bias, it does not make any difference whether
we are dealing with short or long run, the estimate of the output-labor
input elasticity is biased upward. Consider the estimation of
et = a0
+
alYt + t (1)
where the "true" relation is
-4-
et = c0 + 1 lt + 2kt +
it is clear that the estimated a1 will be
Cov (y t,kt)
1 1  2 y+
v(y t
where y and e are the log of output and the log of labor and cov(-),
v(*) are respectively covariance and variance. It is apparent now that
whether we interpret k as the actual capital stock at some point in time,
reflecting capital-labor substitution, or the capital stock corresponding
to a certain age distribution of different machines as long run considerations
would suggest, or should k be the short run utilization rate of existing
machines, to estimate (1) with OLS would yield estimates inconsistent
and biased towards increasing returns to labor.
As Table I shows whether we are dealing with short or long run
the estimated forms look quite similar, the main difference being the
presence of one or more lagged terms for employment and a first or second
degree polynomial in time accounting for capital stock and technical
progress.
Table Ia),b)
KALDORC) [ ]
(U.K., 1954-1964)
NEILD [ ]
(U.K., 1949-1961)
BRECHLING [
(U.K.
KUH [ ]
(U.S., 1948-1960)
E t = -1.028 + 0.516X t
E t = 0.260 + 0.723*Et-1 + 0.158*X t + 0.0080"Xt-1 - 0.000235*t
M = 0.092 + 0.838Mt-l + 0.252*X t - 0.133X - 0.000283*tt t-l t t-1
2
AE t = 1.096 + .182Xt + .00013"t + .0000087t - .319H - .408E
2
AM = 1.455 + .341X + .0061t - .000024t - .347H - .717E
t t t t-l
X = ? + 1.426Mt - 1.380M + .257Mt + .019Kt + .690X
D =
X = ? + 1.506M - 1.322M + .179M .117K + .627X
t t t-1 Ot - t-1
ND = ? + 1.250M - 1.428M + .326M - .130K + .814X
t t t-1 Ot t t-1
a) This summary table does not give full justice to the authors mentioned in the sense that it arbitrarily reports
the parts of their empirical results that seemed more relevant in this context.
D ND
b) Et, M , MOt Xt, XD , XN D are respectively employment,manhours, overhead manhours, aggregate output, output in the
durabes and non-durables sector, all in log terms. Data are quarterly in all cases with the exceptionof,
Kaldor who uses log changes in annual data. All the U.K. regressions are relative to the manufacturing sector.
c) This regression is relative to the manufacturing sector of the U.K. economy. Kaldor actually produces some
other cross sectional (across countries)-time series evidence for other sectors as well. However, the sample
period is different for different countries, so that the results do not seem to have an immediate interpretation.
-6-
,-1
Oal
Ball and St. Cyr [ ]
(U.K., 19551 to 196411)
Brechling and O'Brien [
(Various periods) Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
U.K.
U.S.A.
] Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
France
Germany
Ireland
1.16
1.23
1.12
1.07
3.19
1.02
1.47
1.46
1.80
1.49
1.38
1.79
1.39
Smyth and Ireland [ 1.42
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Most of the mentioned authors implicitly assumed that the
capital stock is continuously operated at full capacity, no matter the
level of output, and that the capital labor ratio is fully flexible.
In this case cov (yt, kt) = 0, and therefore a regression of the
logarithm of output versus the logarithm of employment would give
unbiased estimates of the coefficient, although the estimates of
the variance-covariance matrix would still be biased. However, it is
generally believed that this is not true: when employment falls so
do capital utilization rates. Furthermore, it should be pointed out
that also in a model with machines of different vintages and with ex post
fixed coefficients the capital labor ratio may well be flexible, capital
may well be continuously utilized and we should not observe8 such
high values of output-employment elasticities. When output falls, newer
types of machines with lower labor input requirement will be utilized.
And in fact it has been shown9 that to ignore the age distribution of
the machines defined as the age of marginal machines, when this is
positively correlated with K causes an upward bias in the output-labor
elasticity estimate.
To reconcile the evidence with the prediction of the theory
two routes have been followed. The first consists in the explicit
introduction of changes in the capital utilization rates. This can be
done either approximating them by changes in variables like "electricity
consumption relative to the installed horsepower of electric motors"1 0
or assuming the existence of a user cost of capital so that sometimes
11
it may be optimal to keep some capital idle. In the first case the
limit of the attempt is obviously in the quality of the proxy chosen.
- 7A -
In the second, the authors, in order to get a testable specification,
make the unsatisfactory assumption that the ratio of the user cost of
capital to the cost of labor is a constant, so that when output falls,
labor and capital utilization fall in the same proportion, and what
appeared to be returns to labor are really returns to scale.
Before proceeding with the exposition of the empirical
results, it may be worthwhile to outline the general idea of what
follows:
(1) Estimation of production functions involves use of variables
that are often unobservable. If one just estimates by OLS what is
observable is very likely to get inconsistent estimates.
(2) The choice is then between trying to approximate the unobservables
by a known series, or using an instrumental variables estimator, or
both. While the consistency and the unbiasedness of the explicit
results one gets with the first procedure are conditional on the
"goodness" of the proxy chosen, a legitimate instrumental variables
estimator would yield consistent estimates in all cases. The
"legitimacy" of an instrument is conditional on the absence of
correlation between the instrument and the variables left out because
unobservable, but correlated with included variables. In our case,
for instance, the selected instruments should be uncorrelated with
capital utilization rates but correlated with output.
(3) The confidence intervals of the instrumental variables estimates
are, however, fairly large, so that often their difference from the
OLS estimates is statistically insignificant on the basis of conventional
but theoretically unjustified criteria of significance -- two standard
- 7B -
error intervals. Then what is needed is a criterion of comparison
between the two estimates that, loosely speaking, weights the
difference in the expected value of the coefficients with the
difference in the expected value of their standard errors. Such a
criterion is provided by the Hausmann Specification Error Text. 1 2
(4) Finally, a fairly interesting conjecture can be stated as a
consequence of not having specified the unobserved variables --
i.e., to use proxies for capital utilization rates or series for the
capital stock where, however, the benchmark value and the depreciation
rate are unobservable anyway. Provided that, (i) the functional form
relating employment and output is of the type of (1); (ii) the
selected set of instruments is orthogonal both to the long run and
to the short run unobservables, the estimates of the effect of changes
in current output on current man-hours are unbiased whatever is the
story told about the underlying technology. More specifically,
there should be no difference between the long and the short run
current labor input-output elasticity estimate.
-8-
3. The Model to Be Reestimated
Most of the authors just mentioned analyze the relation between
labor input and output either at an aggregate level or at a two sector
level of disaggregation. One of the most careful and detailed
investigations at a more disaggregated level is that by Nordhaus.1 3
His paper is partly aimed at different goals, but the starting point
is the estimation of an equation relation man-hours to output and
time for twelve industries of the U.S. economy. The main features
and results of this section of his paper are:
(i) The specification of a cyclical correction of the
productivity measure based on the fact that cyclical movements in
output influence productivity. From this follows the use of the
concept of normal output as the "level that GNP would attain if the
unemployment rate were at its normal level defined as its postwar
average of 4.7%. '1 4 Roughly the same concept has then been used at
industry level.
(ii) The results, all based on OLS estimation procedure, were
that "Six of the twelve industries show significant increasing returns
- 9-
(to labor): agriculture, durable manufacturing, transportation, public
utilities, trade and services. The remainder display no significant
departure from constant returns; no industry has significant decreasing
returns." 15
His model starts with the estimation of
log(GNP)t = a0 + Xlt + a2(Ut 
- 4.7%) + a3 (Utl-1 - 4.7%) + 6t
then the definition of normal output, xn for the aggregate is derived
xn = log(XN) = log(GNP)t - a2(Ut - 4.7%) - &3 (Ut_- - 4.7%) (2)
obviously equivalent to
xn = 0 +  t + u0  (2')
where the estimate of the inclusion of the residual is justified because
"Any changes in the underlying growth rate of output, such as the
acceleration in the late 1960s due to the more rapid growth of the labor
force, should also appear in the estimated growth of normal output." 1 6
An obvious remark would be that these effects should either be
estimated separately or care should be used in the subsequent estimates
to avoid bias and inconcistency. A relationship for the aggregate is
then derived
e - xn = 00 + 1 0 (x - xn) + 620t + v 0 (3)
where: e is the log of man hours.
- 10 -
TABLE II
-- Regression Estimates for Aggregate Labor Productivity
-- Samples 48-73 and 48-71
-- (Standard Errors)
Independent
Variables
OLS
Sample:48-71
OLS
Sample:48-73
TSLS(1)
Sample: 48-73
TSLS(2)
Sample:51-73
600
(constant)
610
(x-xn)
620
(time)
- 1.0746
(0.0094)
0.8981
(0.1437)
- 0.02413
(0.0006)
0.02110
0.511
S.E.
D.W.
- 1.0799
(0.0094)
0.8816
(0.150)
- 0.0235
(0.0005)
0.0219
0.43
- 1.086
(0.015)
1.783
(0.500)
- 0.0231
(0.0009)
0.0351
0.78
- 1.104
(0.0091)
1.229
(0.139)
- 0.022
(0.0005)
0.0123
1.87
R 0.98 0.9940.98 0.96
- 10A -
Nordhaus' results are replicated, abstracting from negligible
differences, in the first column.17 The second contains the same
results over the extended sample 48-73. Col. 3 reports the result of
a TSLS procedure where the log of total money supply, the New York
Fed discount rate and the lagged value of exports have been used
as instruments. Since the null hypothesis of significant serial
correlation could not be rejected than the OLS estimates were
corrected in col. 4 and an instrumental variables procedure correcting
for it was performed using Fair's method.1 8
The results of it are reported under the heading of I.V.(2).
Furthermore, given the quite substantial difference between the OLS
estimates and the ones reported in Column 3, it was considered
appropriate to use a different set of instruments just in order to
see how much the estimates of 610 were effected by a different selection.
So that besides the instruments suggested by Fair in order to obtain
a consistent estimate when the errors are serially correlated, the
following instruments were used in Column 4: the same set as in
Column 3, an age variable describing the ratio of people of age
between 16 and 19 out of the total population, female labor force
and short term capital flows. There is no specific explanation of
why these were the instruments used besides the fact that they
were considered a priori uncorrelated with the variables left out,
but correlated with the included ones. Results did not change
substantially so that it then becomes clear that for the aggregate,
the two contentions advanced in the first paragraph, namely that
(i) OLS estimates of equations like (3) are biased and inconsistent
- 11 -
and that (ii) if account is taken of this, diminishing marginal
returns to labor could be detected, are verified. To see this more
clearly consider the following test for specification error, recently
discovered by J. Hausman. If 610 and 610 are respectively the estimates
19
of Columns 2 and 4, let
q 610 10
It will then be true that
^2q
m = 1 V( F(, 21)
1 • V(q)
q m m
0.315 9 7.95
As it can be seen, m exceeds its critical value m at 1%
confidence level, therefore suggesting evidence of serious misspecification
in production functions of the form of (3).
Finally it may be comforting to know that the I.V. estimate of
1 - 0.813 obtained in the last column of Table 2 coincides almost
10 20
perfectly with the one obtained by Solow (0.815), where he chooses
- 12 -
the route of approximating capital utilization rates by electricity
consumption relative to the installed horsepower of electric
motors.
Since at the disaggregate level there is no concept
immediately equivalent to normal output such that cyclical elements could
be eliminated, Nordhaus found necessary to introduce the concept
of "normal industrial demand defined as "...that level of industrial
demand that would be forthcoming if aggregate demand were at its
normal level." 21 More specifically, demand for output in each sector i
is
x = a i + li(Pi - p) + 2i(Ut-4.7%) + 3ixn + li (4)
where
x. = log of gross output originating by industry i
in 1958 prices
Pi = log of deflator for xi
p = log of a geometric index of prices using 1958
output weights
Normal output is then:
xni = g0i + ali(Pi - p) + a3i xn (5)
This time residuals are excluded from the definition of
xn., but in this case OLS is a textbook example of estimation biased from
- 13 -
simultaneity. Normal output is produced by a log linear production
function
qni = Oi + lieni + 2i.ki + B3it + B2i
where
en. = log of normal labor input1
k. = log of net capital stock1
qni = log of normal output
Assuming finally: that (1) normal output is always equal to normal
demand, (2) CRTS are prevailing and (3) the capital-labor ratio grows
at an exponential rate, ui' we have that:
eni = xni  Oi - (3i + uiB2i)t - E2i
For each industry i, it is assumed that manhours adjust to short-run
demand according to
ei - eni = 6li (x
- xni) + E3i
So that substituting the form to be estimated is
ei - xni = 60 + li(xi - xni) + 2it + ni (9)
Estimates of equation (9) for the twelve sectors of the U.S. economy are
produced in Table III.
(6)
(7)
(8)
a 6
TABLE III
Coefficients for Labor Productivity Equations
Industry
Agriculture
Mining
Independ.
Variable
6
01
6i
11
6
12
S.E.
D.W.
-2
R
612
622
S.E.
D.W.
OLS
Sample:
48-71
9.48
0.476
(0.136)
OLS
Sample:
48-73
0.0046
0.533
(0.229)
-0.053 -0.0614
(0.0003) (0.0007)
0.0132
1.28
0.999
7.82
1.080
(0.136)
-0.0375
0.0317
0.47
0.0276
1.19
0.996
-1.66
0.786
(0.202)
-0.0357
0.0474
0.33
0.988 0.971 0.967 0.992 0.986
I.V. (2)
Sample:
51-73 3SLS(2)
I.V.
Sample
48-73
0.0058
1.164
(0.489)
-0.065
(0.00083)
0.0319
2.09
0.995
-1.67
1.182
(0.414)
-0.0354
0.0512)
0.35
OLS
Sample:
51-73
0.0105
0.116
(0.191)
-0.061
(0.0019)
0.0243
1.57
0.997
-4.93
0.969
(0.104)
0.036
(0.310)
0.0224
1.20
0.173
1.669
(0.467)
-0.0621
(0.00079)
0.0229
1.63
0.997
4.53
1.112
(0.168)
0.0243
0.0288
1.59
0.967 0.992 0.9860.988 0.971
Industry
3
Construction
Independ.
Variable
603
613
623
S.E.
D.W.
-2
R
614
Manufacturing
Non-durable 624
S.E.
D.W.
OLS
Sample:
48-71
8J83
1.480
(0.374)
OLS
Sample:
48-73
-1.31
1.510
(0.251)
-0.0090 0.000561
(0.0024) (0.00147)
0.0800
0.23
0.608
8.55
0.0561
0.30
0.56
5.98
0.923 0.969
(0.0749) (0.136)
-0.0314
(0.00039)
0.0130
1.05
-0.0326
(0.00060)
0.0228
0.43
-2
R 0.997
R 0.997 0.992 0.99 0.997 0.993
I.V. (2)
Sample:
51-73 3SLS (2)
I.V.
Sample:
48-73
01.30
1.216
(0.368)
0.00035
(0.0015)
0.0577
0.29
0.54
5.98
1.06
(0.178)
-0.0326
(0.00061)
0.0231
0.50
OLS
Sample:
51-73
-1.47
1.462
(0.150)
0.009
(0.0046)
0.0254
2.69
0.911
6.03
0.845
(0.0717)
-0.0128
(0.0466)
0.0123
1.56
-1.42
1.406
(0.218)
0.00644
(0.00499)
0.0350
2.31
0.831
6.195
1.221
(.191)
-0.0422
(0.0171)
0.0188
1.66
0.9930.992 0.99 0.997
Industry
Manufacturing
Durables
Independ.
Variable
60 5
615
625
S.E.
D.W.
-2
R
OLS
Sample:
48-71
8.49
0.830
(0.058)
-0.025
(0.00072)
0.0242
1.06
0.986
OLS
Sample:
48-73
5.84
0,825
(0.066)
-0,026
(0.00071)
0.0270
0.87
0.985
I.V.
Sample:
48-73
5,83
1.030
(0.127)
-0,025
(0.00086)
0.0321
0.77
0.978
OLS
Sample:
51-73
5.88
0.822
(0.0744)
-0.0281
(0.00153)
-. 0200
1.53
0.991
8.53
6
Transportation
616
626
S.E.
D.W.
0.575
(0.145)
-0.116
1.911
(0.198)
-0.0332 -0.0441
(0.00.0) (0.0012)
0.0337
0.85
0.0486
0.78
-0. 11
2.21
(0.479)
-0.0439-
(0.0013)
0.0511
0.93
-0.059
1.71
(0.219)
-0.047
(0.0035)
0.0390
1.36
-0.06
1.71
(0.236)
-0,0467
(0.0031)
0.0428
1.47
-2 0.982
R~_ 0.98 0.8 0.8 0.860.8
I.V. (2)
Sample:
51-73 3SLS (2)
5.83
1.191
(0.235)
-0.025
(0.00154)
0.0528
2.10
0.937
_____ __
0.982 0.980 0.986 0.983
Industry
Independ.
Variable
607
7
Communication
8
Public/
Utilities
17
27
S.E.
D.W.
-2
R
608
618
628
S.E.
D.W.
OLS
Sample:
48-71
8.27
1.242
(0.351)
OLS
Sample:
48-73
-0.698
0.756
(0.306)
-0.0565 -0.0551
(0.0011) (0.00101)
0.037
0.54
0.992
7.79
0.413
(0.149)
-0.0547
(0.0094)
0.0320
0.52
0.038
0.42
0.991
-1.12
0.159
(0.067)
-0.0523
(0.00053)
0.0192
0.98
R 0.994 0.99 0.91
I.V. (2)
Sample:
51-73 3SLS(2)
I.V.
Sample:
48-73
-0.698
1.295
(0.559)
-0.00551
(0.0010)
(0.041
0.46
0.99
OLS
Sample:
51-73
-0.85
0.91
(0.176)
-0.0474
(0.0147)
0.0252
1.72
0.995
-0.72
1.418
(0.575)
-9.0534
(0.0036)
0.0320
1.60
0.993
4.43
0.474
(0.343)
-0.0169
(0.0233)
0.0323
0.18
__
Independ.
VariableIndustry
OLS
Sample:
48-71
8.80
619
Trade
629
S.E.
D.W.
-2
R
610
110
210Fire
0.433
(0.150)
-0.027
(0.00047)
0.0160
1.42
0.99
OLS
Sample:
48-73
0.52
0.520
(0.131)
-0.0232
(0.00039)
0.0151
1.29
0.99
I.V.
Sample:
48-73
-0.98
1.071
(0.99)
-0.0231
(0.00058)
0.0201
1.31
0.98
OLS
Sample:
51-73
-0.97
0.575
(0.138)
-0.0234
(0.0006)
0.0125
1.44
0.993
-0.97
1.041
(0.169)
-0.0238
(0.00048)
0.0102
2.08
0.995
7.47
0.717
(0.270)
-0.0167
(0.00098)
0.0331
0.46
I.V. (2)
Sample:
51-73 3SLS(2)
S.E.
D.W.
4 1
OLS
Sample:
48-71
OLS
Sample:
48-73
0.09
111
211Services
S.E.
D.W.
-2R
6012
112Government
6212
S.E.
D.W.
0.548
(0.123)
-0.0095
(0.00055)
0.0187
0.82
0.938
-1.10
0.635
(0.115)
-0.0047
(0.00049)
0.0190
0.50
0.826
-1.10
1.044
(0.227)
-0.0047
(0.00062)
0.0237
0.38
0.73
-1.12
0.690
(0.146)
-0.0035
(0.0019)
0.0130
1.66
0.801
-1.11
1.343
(0.368)
-0.0045
(0.00051)
0.0176
1.92
.757
9.05
0.974
(0.0309)
0.0014
(0.00023)
0.0076
1.32
R- 0.980
Industry
Independ.
Variable
I.V.
Sample:
48-73
OLS
Sample:
51-73
I.V. (2)
Sample:
51-73 3SLS (2)
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The first and the second Column of the Table contain,
respectively, Nordhaus' estimates and the ones over the larger sample
48-73.
The third column shows an instrumental variables estimate
without correction for serial correlation. Since we could not reject
the null hypothesis of zero first order serial correlation, unbiased
estimates of the residuals to be used in subsequent testing, were
derived correcting both the OLS and the instrumental variables
estimates, these last using Fair's method. The fourth and the fifth
columns display these results. As in the case of Table 2, different
sets of instruments were used in deriving the results of Column
3 and 5.
There are not that many comments to be made: (i) Table III
more dramatically confirms the aggregate results: diminishing marginal
returns to labor are present and significant in all nine sectors
of the U.S. economy; that is to say, in the sectors where the
available data were such that some hypothesis could be tested. In
the case of Public Utilities, Finance Insurance and Real Estate and
Government, no meaningful tests were possible given the poor
quality of the available data.
In particular, in the case of four sectors, agriculture,
construction, transportation, and communication, the output-labor
input elasticity is below 0.71. However, it should be mentioned
that the hypothesis of constant or increasing returns to labor can
be rejected at 5% level only in the case of construction and trans-
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portation. If full account were taken of a cross equations
correlation, it would have been possible to obtain more precise
estimates in the direction of diminishing returns. This suggests
the use of a full information instrumental variables estimator
having the same expected value as the ones in Columns 3 and 5, but
a lower standard error. Unfortunately, computations seemed too
cumbersome to be completed at the present moment.
A more interesting question appears to be the one concern-
ing the bias of OLS estimates caused by the neglect of changes in
utilization of other factors of production. Table 3 shows that in the
cases where diminis-ing returns were detected starting with, instrument-
al variables estimates did not contradict the OLS results. The
following Table 4 shows the outcome of the specification error test
described above.
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TABLE IV
Specification Error Test
Industry q m
Agriculture 1.553 12.99
Mining 0.143 1.97
Construction -0.062 0.80
Manufacturing Non- 0.381 6.04
Durables
Manufacturing 0.368 8.10
Durables
Transportation 0 0
Communication 0.50 0.88
Trade 0.466 13.64
Services 0.653 4.42
Since m has a critical value m = 4.30 at 5% level, the
null hypothesis of absence of misspecification can be decisely
rejected in the case of Agriculture, Manufacturing Durables and
Non-Durables, Trade, and Services. Communication is the only
industry where, although the use of instrumental variables resulted
in a quite different point estimates, it was not possible to reject
the hypothesis of misspecification, given the high standard error
of the consistent estimate.
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cov(x, xn)(I = 6 + (1-) co(x,) (10)(I) V
Then suppose that 6) were an unbiased estimate if it
were not for the cyclical correction. We would then rewrite (10) as
S= 6 + (1 - ) cov(x, xn)S (III) +(I) V(x)
According to Table I results, 6 < 1. This together with the
fact that cov(x, xn) > 0, under any reasonable assumption, should
result in 6 > (III)' the corresponding estimate in Tables II
and III. In fact the opposite is true. This shows that the presence
of the cyclical correction does, if anything, strengthen the comparison
in favor of Tables II and III results.
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4. Conclusions
Instead of summarizing the techniques and results
discussed in the previous sections I will try to sketch some
implications and some very tentative conclusions of these findings.
1- Behavior of unobservables
As we saw in section 2, the upward bias in the estimate
of labor productivity comes from having neglected some variables
in the estimated form. By inspection of equations (1) and (2) one
can give a deterministic interpretation of this bias. Suppose
the function one estimates is y = 1le, while the true form is
y = Ble + B2k. The bias would then be
I dk( 1 - 1) 2 de
where would be equal tode from the first specification. So
that for given B2, the extent of the bias depends on the degree of
substitutability between labor and the unobserved variables along an
dk
output path. In particular for dk = 0, we would have the estimatesde
dk
of Table (I), forde = 1, B1 would be a scale elasticity along the
Ireland and Smith's interpretation. Therefore, for any plausible
dk
value of 0 < B2 < 1, de must be quite above 1 to yield the differences
between biased and unbiased estimates reported in Tables (II) and
(III). In particular, from the presence or absence of bias one can
dkderive the behavior of de. As we saw in the case of two industries,
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Construction and Transportation, the instrumental variable estimate
did not yield results dignificantly different from the OLS estimates
dk
suggesting therefore that d= 0. Then, if we interpret k as the
amount of utilized capital, it turns out that capital utilization
rates change more than proportionately than employment, as output
changes, and this happens in the case of all sectors, with the
exception of Construction and Transportation. The overall picture
is then of labor being much more of a fixed factor relative to capital.
(ii) How can the above results be reconciled with the fact that
observed labor productivity, i.e., output per man-hour, moves procy-
clically? The answer depends on the interpretation one gives to
the unobserved variables and rests on the fact that observed data
attribute changes in output to changes in man-hours only, while
other factors of production are changing as well. A possible inter-
pretation is the one outlined above suggesting that when output
falls, man-hours decrease less than in proportion (labor productivity
rises) but capital utilitation rates fall more than proportionately
with respect to the decline in man-hours. Another suggestive
interpretation would identify the unobserved variables with
other factors of production like raw materials. This is particularly
interesting because while we may think of capital utilization
rates as being essentially determined by demand factors, we can
easily imagine exogenous factors affecting the quantity of raw
materials used by different industries. 2 4
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(iii) Distribution Theory
In the past twenty years, one of the criticisms at the
empirical level raised against the neoclassical theory of distribution,
was the impossibility of measuring the share of capital defined as
aggregate capital times its marginal product. If this is the issue,
the method outlined in the previous sections seems to show,in principle
at least, that we do not need what Hahn and Matthews call "our
armchair omniscience (that) can take account of each machine separately." 25
If some production function is assumed where the only
factors are capital and labor, it is enough to have a consistent
estimate of the labor share in order to be able to derive the share
of capital,conditionally on the form of the production function
assumed. Obviously all this may have nothing to do with distribution
in reality, but for reasons other than the impossibility of measuring
26
aggregate capital.
(iv) Okun's Law:
It might be tempting to relate the above results to Okun's
Law and to consider them as contradicting the fact that when
unemployment fall by x per cent, output rises by more than x per
cent. I think this is a mistake: findings of this nature can
contradict only explanations of the Law and not the Law itself.
More specifically, they seem to show that only one of these
27
explanations is not verified.
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APPENDIX A
The data are substantially the same as those used by
Nordhaus and the reader is referred to his careful discussion.
There is only one notable exception: in the cases of total man-hours
of production workers, in the Transportation and Communication
industries, the published data are available only since 1964. For
the previous years Nordhaus relied on the crude technique of using
a fixed-weight index of hours for the industrial sector (mining
and manufacturing) as a substitute up to 1964. Instead, we have used
the concept of "Number of full-time equivalent employees" measuring
man-years of full-time employment of wage and salary workers and
its equivalent in work performed by part-time workers. The definition
of full-time employment is the number of hours that are customary
at a particular time and place. For a description of the concept,
see "Survey of Current Business," June 1945, pp. 17-18.
The following Table describes the instruments used in
obtaining the instrumental variables estimates of 61i without and
with correction for serial correlation, respecively, shown in
Columns 3 and 5 of Table III.
Equation Age Subal IA RMC GF Money Ex
40
Agriculture (3) + + + +
(5) + + +
Mining (3) + + +
(5) + + + +
Construction (3) + + +
(5) + i + +
Mfg.non-durables (3) + + + +
(5) + + + + +
Mfg. durables (3) + + + +
(5) ++ + + + +
Transportation (3) - + +
(5) + + + +
Communication (3) + +
(5) + +
Trade (3) + +
(5) + + + + +
Services (3) + + +
(5)
where: Age is the age composition variable previously mentioned; S.pal are subsidies to agriculture lagged
two ormore periods; IA is investment in farm residential structures lagged two or more periods; RMC is the money
rate on prime commercial paper from 4 to 6 months; GF is Federal Government Purchases of goods and services;
Money is maximal money supply total; Ex are exports of goods and services; RMF is the discount rate of N.Y.Fed.;
JMVMF is the value index of U.S. domestic imports of finished manufactures; LCF is civilian labor force female;
BOP35 are short term capital flows.
These instruments have indifferently been used as they appear, and/or lagged one or more periods, and/or in log
form, or in other functional forms. It should finally be mentioned that in the case of each of the column 5 estimates
the set of additional instruments suggested by Fair's method should be added to ones reported in previous table.
Industry RMF JMVMF LCF BOP35
r
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Notes
1. Solow, R.M. [ 18 ], p.316 , who is, as far as the nature of the
results he gets in this paper, one notable exception.
2. Kaldor, N. [ 12 ].
3. Kaldor, N. [ 11 ]. For recent controversies on the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law, see
Rowthorn, R.E. [16] and Cripps, T.F. and Tarling, R.J. [5].
4. Nordhaus, W.D. [ 15 ].
5. Salter [ 17 ], Kaldor, op. cit.
6. Distributed log extimation does not help in this sense. For an
example consider the three years distributed lag of [ 9 ]
necessary to have a meaningful estimate of such elasticity.
7. It should be pointed out that Kuh is the only exception who finds
in one the many estimated forms a long run labor-output elasticity
of 1.22, pp. 9-10 [ 13 1.
8. However, with respect to this, Solow [ 18 ] says, "firms own capacity
of various vintages and efficiencies, and the age distribution
varies among firms. When industry output falls, reduction
in sales are distributed unevenly among firms because of
geographical advantages, customer-relationships, and other
imperfections of the market." But then it should be explained
why in the early part of the cycle we generally do not observe
significant shifts in the productivity weights of different
industries. See Kuh, op. cit.
9. Solow [ 19 ].
10. Solow [ 18 1p. 319, Whitaker [21]
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11. Ireland, N.J. and Smyth, D.F. op. cit. The last three quotations
of Table I are taken from [10].
12. Hausman, J. [8].
13. Nordhaus, W. D., op. cit.
14. Nordhaus, W. D., op. cit., p. 495.
15. Nordhaus, W. D., op. cit., p. 502, where the significance criterion
is given by a 20 confidence interval.
16. Nordhaus, W. D., op. cit., p. 495.
17. The 610 should not be compared with the sum of the corresponding
coefficients in Nordhaus' Table 1, but with the 610 obtained
using only the current value of (x-xn). See Nordhaus, op. cit.,
p. 504, note 17.
18. Fair [6].
19. q was obviously computed based on an OLS regression performed
over the same sample and corrected for first order serial
correlation as the I.V.(2) estimates. The results are in Col. 4.
20. Solow, R. M. [18].
21. Nordhaus, W. D. [15], p. 493.
23. The data used in the cases of Transportation, Communication and
Public Utilities are different from the ones used by
Nordhaus. For a description of the difference and of the
instruments used in Cols. 3 and 5, see the Appendix.
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24. For example one may be tempted to explain the fall in
labor produ-tivity that happened when the U.S. 1974
recession was at its bottom, with the increase in the price
of oil and the consequent reduction in energy utilization,
while unemployment did not yet significantly change.
25. Quotation taken from Atkinson, A.B. [1], Hahn, F. H. and
Matthews, R. C. 0. [7].
26. However, consider the estimate of 1,22 obtained in the last
column of Table III. The labor share is e • Z 1
e 1.22
Assuming a Cobb-Doublas production function, this would yield
an average estimate of the ratio of total profits to total
wages, defined as total proprietors income and private
wages and salaries, of approximately 0.234, where the
actual mean ratio is 0.205,
27. A conceivable implication in this respect might only regard the
welfare prescriptions derived from estimates of labor
productivity that are upward biased. In particular, suppose
that utilization rates of existing machines can be changed
independently from employment, say through a change in the
user cost of capital, we would then observe increases in
output that do not follow corresponding changes in the employed
labor force. For those who think that the main reason for
lower unemployment rates lies in the great increases in
output, evidence and hypothesis as the ones suggested above
should lead to a downward revision of the weight attached
to unemployment in a hypothetical welfare function.
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Real Wages, Employment and Output
The last empirical point of this chapter concerns the relation
between the demand for labor and real wages. As in the case of the output-
labor input elasticity estimates, this is an open question in the sense
that while the evidence2 4 uniformly points in the direction of procyclical
movements of real wages with respect to output and employment,
neoclassical theory, whether its conclusions are derived from a fixed
coefficients production function or from a Cobb-Douglas, predicts
anticyclical movements. As historical account of the controversy that
started immediately after the publication of the General Theory with
an exchange of dissenting views, on the E.J. of 1938 between Keynes
and Dunlop, can be found in Bodkin. Such a diversity of opinions is
still actual since some recent contributions try to explain among
other things, the dynamic behavior of real wages, employment and output
such as the one by Barro and Grossman predicts procyclical movements
while Solow and Stiglitz hold an opposite point of view.2 5
In this paragraph such relation will be explored at both aggregate and
disaggregate level.
The first question to be asked is what is exactly the relation
that someone wants to estimate. There is no unique answer to this
question since it depends on whether the production function is
supposed to describe a short or a long run technological constraint
and on whether we assume that firms price their output at marginal
cost or on a mark up based on a minimum average cost of which unit
labor cost is the main component. In this case, the amount of the
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mark up would be determined by entry-preventing or other oligopolistic
considerations. Therefore, while changes in output would call for
changes in employment and money wages, prices would be insensitive
(if we make abstraction from changes in the size of the market) in the
short run and therefore real wages, should be positively
correlated with changes in employment and output. Here are three
possible specifications:
P = e = ( ) , <1
output in the short run can change only if labor changes because capital
is always fully utilized, its costs have been completely repaid, and
there is no user cost of capital; a and y are respectively the labor
coefficient and the rate of technological progress.
If capital is not fully utilized or if its costs are not
completely sunk or if there is some kind of user cost, we would have
(II) w r )/e-Yt t+ 8 = 1, O < < 1
P B P e
where and r are respectively the capital coefficient in the production
function and r/P can be interpreted either as the real cost of capital
or as a user cost. It is worth being noticed that if we estimate (I)
while the true model in log linear form is
t
In(w/P) = + In (r/P) + n () -
the OLS estimate a(I) from (I) will be
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S+Coy [in(r/P), in(y/e)] - Coy [In(t), In(y/e)]
(I) = V[1n(y/e)] B V[1n(y/e)]
where it is assumed that the R.H.V. of (II) are uncorrelated with the
error term, which says that:
(i) I has to be reinterpreted as a/B, so that values of
I bigger than one should not be a surprise and do not contradict
diminishing marginal returns to labor;
(ii) If there is any substitution in the short run also,
Cov (r/P, y/e) < 0, at most it will be equal to zero in the case of
no substitution at all. Further, we should expect Cov (y/e, t) > 0.
From all this we should expect a to be biased towards zero.
The third specification would be
(III)
where m
minimum
wy -
= -( + m)P e*
is the mark up over the competive price pc set equal to the
average cost
.16
1"
p = Pc(l + m) = w -1 (1 + m)
where y* and e* are the cost minimizing level of output and labor input.
This theory, while still holding that real wages move with long run
labor productivity, will predict that in the short run output and
employment will be largely uncorrelated with price changes and
positively correlated with changes in nominal wages because of changes
in the number of vacancies. So that a suitable test of this theory would
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be to estimate a relation of the form
(IIIa) in (W) = + e + (Y) +
P e
where YW can either be approximated by a time trend and/or by actual
e
productivity. On the basis of this theory, we should expect to be positive
and significant. There is one major qualification to be made with respect
to this: "With much idle capacity, the temptation for individual members
of the oligopolistic group to secure a larger share of the shurnken business
is very strong. Thus.... a resultant fall in the effective price if not
in the quoted one."26 then may well turn up to be negative and the
resultant behavior virtually undistinguishable from the competitive one. The
main difference among these specifications is really between II and III(a).
While the first says that real wages can change only if labor marginal
productivity changes, the second contains additional elements of a
behavior of the labor market that is in the short run largely independnet
of the marginal productivity of labor. Therefore if we estimate III(a)
while the true model is II, the estimated should be either negative
and significant or positive and non-significantly different from 0. Whether
positive or negative, an OLS estimate of III(a) when the true model is
II should yield estimates biased toward zero.
The second question concerns the estimation of relations like
(I)-(III) at the aggregate level. While at the sectorial level there
is no doubt about which price deflator to use, i.e., the output price
deflator of the sector, at aggregate level there is no clear
correspondent between the wage, employment concepts and the price
deflator. So that at the economy level, it is not clear whether we are
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testing for the equilibrium proposition that firms do by-and-large
price at marginal cost or for some empirical regularity between
the purchase in power of wages and output and employment. This
explains why five different deflators have been used: PI, the
implicit price deflator (i/p.d,), net domestic product, non-farm
business; P2, i.p.d. of personal consumption expenditures; P3
the wholesale price index of all commodities less farm products;
P 4 the implicit price deflator of gross domestic product; P5'
the consumer price index of all items. The employment and the wage
concepts are respectively total employment in non-agricultural
establishments and hourly earnings of production workers,
private non-agricultural. Tables IV and VI respectively show the
OLS and the 2SLS estimates of equations II (where r/P has been
assumed unobservable) and III, for different definitions of real
wages.
TABLE IV
-- Estimates of real wages, employment and time at the aggregate level;
-- In(w )t = + lEt + a2 t + t
-- Observations = 26;
-- (Standard errors).
Real Wages
Independent
Variable
a0 0.70 2.15
o 0.0232 -0,366
In(P-) (0.0710) (0.198)
a2 0.0188 0.0272
(0.0015) (0.0042)
S.E. 0.0112 0.0171
D.W. 0.48 0.50
-2R2 0.994 0.98
g0  1.13 2.87
Sn(-0.0930 -0-560
n (P (0.0914) (0.2451)
22 0.0216 0.0316
(0.0019) (0.0052)
S.E. 0.0144 0.0211
D.W. 0.37 0.55
2 0.990 0.980R 0.990 0.980
In(p - )
3
S.E.
D.W.
-2R
0.73
-0.0861
(0.1144)
0.0290
(0.0024)
0.0181
1.40
0.992
2.21
-0.484
(0.2222)
0.0374
(0.0047)
0.0223
0.84
0.988
OLS TSLS
Real Wages
Independent
Variable
1
0 
,63 3,31
1 -0.208 -0.,658
In( ) (0.1114) (0.2214)
P2  0.0217 0.0313
(0.0024) (0.0048)
S.E. 0.0176 0.0230
D.W. 0.36 0.53
-2R2 0.982 0.97
C0 1.89 3.57
S1 -0.363 -0.811
n( (0.1296) (0.2494)P
52 0.0268 0.0382
(0.0028) (0.0053)
S.E. 0.0205 0.0253
D.W. 0.59 0,83
-2R 0.983 0.975
OLS TSLS
- --- -- - -- I - - - w W 0 - q - . - A , r
TABLE V
Aggregate Relation:
Observations = 26
ln( -- )
= + BIlnE + 21lny + S3 T + y
Real Wages
Independent
Variable OLS
-0.0221
In(P )
1
3
S.E.
D.W.
TSLS
-0.371
-0.1052 -0.3087
(0.0950) (0.1535)
0.1963 0.3770
(0.1026) (0.1681)
0.0145 0.0124
(0.0026) (0.0048)
0.0106
0.50
0.994
0.50
0.0117
0.47
0.993
-0.449
In(- )
2
S.E.
D.W.
-2
R
-0.204 -0.3028
(0.1277) (0.1422)
0.1700
(0.1379)
0.0179
(0.0036)
0.0143
0.37
0.991
0.3855
(0.1694)
0.0123
(0.0045)
0.0151
0.40
0.990
- --- --~-l---f-2- 1- -- -
a 4
Real Wages
Independent
Variable
In(p
3
3
S.E.
D.W.
-2
R
In( )
4
3
S.E.
D.W.
-2
R
0.90
-0.446
(0.2271)
0.1856
(0.2451)
0.0313
(0.0064)
0.0254
1.22
0.986
0.002
-0.497
(0.1352)
-2.81
-1.073
(0.412)
1.175
(0.5781)
0.0092
(0.0143)
0.0335
1.08
0.976
-0.23
-0.515
(0.147)
0.442 0.491
(0.1460) (0.2274)
0.0120 0.0106
(0.0038) (0.0065)
0.0151
0.48
0.987
0.24
0.0152
0.50
0.987
-1.80
-0.6563 -1.039
(0.1650) (0.274)
In(- )
P5
S.E.
D.W.
-2
R
0.447
(0.1781)
0.0188
(0.0046)
0.0185
0.61
0.986
1.014
(0.3848)
0.0068
(0.0095)
0.0223
0.59
0.980
OLS TSLS
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The following remarks are worth being made: (i) Both
Tables IV and V show that aggregate real wage is significantly
and negatively correlated with employment, no matter which is the
price index chosen to deflate aggregate nominal wages; (ii) This
is true both of the OLS and the TSLS estimates, with the only
exception of the first OLS estimate of Table IV showing that when
the ijp.d. of the private business non-farm output is chosen, a
statistically insignificant but positive relation can be detected.
However, the OLS estimates of Table IV are inconsistent since
form III(a) is subject to serious misspecification of the following
table shows. Furthermore these estimates are biased towards zero
as we expected, for the reasons just mentioned.
Test for Specification Error in III(a)
q m
Equations
I
II
III
IV
V m =
(iii) It is interesting to notice that the TSLS of Table IV do
by and large (within a two standard erros confidence interval) coincide
with the OLS estimates of Table V which seems to say that II is a
specification closer to the true one; (iv) In Table V labor productivity
has been estimated unconstrained just in order to see whether the
employment term can effect real wages independently from productivity:
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neither OLS nor TSLS estimates show significant difference in the
magnitude of the coefficients, leading therefore to the rejection
of the hypothesis maintaining that employment has such independent
effect on real wages in the aggregate; (v) The estimates of Table V
and the TSLS estimates of Table IV square quite consistently with
those of Table II, where the consistent estimates yield values
between 0.58 and 0.81.
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Similar tests have finally been performed at a disaggregate
28
level for four sectors : Mining, Construction, Manufacturing
Durables and Non-Durables. They are reported in Tables VI and
VII. The aggregate picture is confirmed quite extensively.
1) In all the estimates of Table VI the employment coefficient is
negative and significantly different from zero, with the exceptions
of the Mining and the Manufacturing Durables industries, where it is
positive but not significantly different from zero. The corresponding
TSLS estimates are always negative and significant. Furthermore it
can be easily verified, applying Hausmann Specification Error test,
that in the case of the above two industries the null hypothesis of
absence of misspecification can be rejected respectively at the 1%
and 5% confidence level. 2 9
2) Although in the case of Table VII it has not been possible to find
Instrumental variables predicting with the same efficiency as at
the aggregate level, the general picture is that the relation between
employment alone and real wages is statistically insignificant.
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Chapter 2
The analysis of open economies has followed, roughly speaking,
three main lines of thought, labelled by the literature as the elasticities,
absorption and monetarist approaches. Although a number of related
issues have been discussed along these lines, the first question, even
chronologically, to which a literature of impressive dimensions was
addressed, is "Under what circumstances will a devaluation improve
the balance of payments of the devaluing country?" The debate was
carried out sometimes assuming Keynesian underemployment, sometimes
full employment. In what follows full employment will always be
assumed.1
The main differences between the first approach and the other two
is in the attention devoted to the traded goods market: in particular
the eleasticities approach relies on the Marshall-Lerner condition, as
a criterion for assessing the effect of a devaluation. It is now
well understood that, with respect to this problem, the answer provided
by this condition is unsatisfactory for the following reasons: (a)
The world excess demand for one of the two goods is mistakenly defined
to be equal to the balance of payments of one of the two countries;
(b) The terms of trade are confused with the exchange rate; (c) The
--------------------------------------------------------
Thanks are due to S.Fischer, F.Modigliani, P.Kouri and to all participants
to the M.I.T. Monetary Workshop "
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-58-
change in excess demand for exportables, following a change in the
terms of trade,is confused with a change in actual exports; but this
is so only if markets for both goods clear before and after the
devaluation.
However, all these misconceptions derive from the fact that the
traditional model is a barter model. If the presence of an asset
like money is not considered, the concepts of exchange rate and of
balance of payments are not well defined and changes in the excess
demand for
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exportables or importables must imply opposite changes in domestic expen-
diture, on the same good requiring thereforethe assumption of continuous
equilibrium, in order for the model to be consistent. But this is so
only because savings were ruled out by assumption.
The absorption and the monetarist analysis on the other hand focus
on the balance of payment as a whole neglecting its composition between
trade balance, interest receipts from capital owned abroad and capital
flows. 2  In the one good version of the monetarist model, the consequences
of changes in the exchange rate on the goods market are then more or less
neglected, relative prices changes and values of the elasticities are
substituted by absolute price changes--being these by definition the
only terms of trade concept we have to look at in a one good model. In line
with the monetarist tradition it is assumed that the economy is in full
employment and that changes in the interest rate do not affect the demand
for money. This last assumption is usually implicit in the small country--
with perfect capital mobility assumption or in the two countries model
capital movements just do not appear explicitly in a bonds market clearing
equation. Real hoarding or real savings is a concept used for three
purposes: it is flow demand for real balances, since other assets are not
explicitly considered, flow excess demand for real balances, since
the nominal money stock is considered as given at each point in time--
being denied to the government the possibility of running a positive deficit
or of making stabilization operations--and it is identically equal to
the balance of payments surplus--this last equality following from the
flow budget constraint for the whole country. In the two goods version--
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traded and non-traded--consumption of both goods is defined to be a
function of expenditure and relative prices. Since expenditure is equal
to real income minus real savings, i.e., balance of payments surplus,
every time that something increases real savings, for example a devaluation
through the real balance effect, consumption of both goods decreases.
But since the non-traded goods market is assumed to clear all the times
at full employment, a balance of payments surplus will always be accompanied
by a decline in the price of home goods in terms of the traded ones.
In this way the switching and the reducing expenditure effect of a
devaluation described by H. G. Johnson [ 10 ] are well captured by this
model.
The purposes of this paper are: (i) A reexamination of the conclu-
sions of this model under more general assumptions concerning the specifi-
cation of the consumption function and the flow demand for assets. With
regard to the first, it is worth noting that the substitution effect of
savings with respect to both goods is due to the assumption of separability--
the marginal rate of substitution between the two goods is independent
on the total quantity of money3--that will be dropped in the following
discussion. With respect to the second, a formulation that more closely
reflects the derivation of the flow demand from underlying stock demand
functions, will be adopted. (ii) Explicit inclusion of government transfers
in the definition of disposable income will permit a discussion, although
from a different standpoint, of the other channel mentioned by Alexander
[1, 2] through which a devaluation may affect the balance of payments,
namely through changes in the distribution of real income.
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(iii) An exposition and possibly a clarification of what seems to have been
a long lively debate among the different approaches on the channels through
which a devaluation is supposed to work. It will be seen that there is
nothing to debate--at least at the theoretical level--if a flow model is
assumed as a description of the economy. On the other hand if demand for
assets are depicted as demand for stocks, the choice of which market to
look at becomes important. In other words, is the type of description
of the assets markets what should have been debated.
These issues will be discussed with the help of a two goods--traded
and non-traded--model. The second section is devoted to the presentation
of a quite general macromodel. Then the demand for assets will be given
the specification that we think proper for a flow model and a discussion
of the effects of a devaluation on relative prices, absolute price level
and interest rate follows in two stages: in the first the analysis will
be a partial equilibrium one in which it will be assumed the existence
of only one country; in the second it will be extended to the
consideration of two countries. In the third section an alternative
approach--the one we believe an elasticity theorist would prefer--will
be suggested and the results will be compared.
2
Two goods are supplied according to
x.s = xi(q) i=1,2 (1)
where xl is the traded good and x2 is the non-traded, q is the relative
price of the non-traded in terms of the traded one
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P2
q 
-
P1
The reward to factors in real terms is
Y = x1s(q) + qx 2 (q) (2)
The government deficit in real terms is
d = G - T + i - + z (3)P1
where G and T are government expenditure and tax collection in real
terms, Bg is the outstanding stock of government debt, z are government
transfers and i is the interest rate. Government debt in real terms is
Ds + B
g = P (4)
where Ds is the outstanding domestic money stock. Government deficit is
equal to the change per unit of time of government debt in real terms
s + gd =  (5)
(3) and (5) imply the government budget constraint. The total monetary
base is made up of two components: the domestic one created by the
central bank and that of foreign origin derived from past accumulation
of balance of payments supluses.
Ms = Ds + F (6)
Purchasing power parity is assumed to hold
e = - (7)P *
where e is the exchange rate and the symbol * denotes the other country
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money price of the traded good. From equations (1) - (5) and (7), disposable
income in real terms is
d s Ls + *g
y x1 s(q) + qx 2 (q) + P - (G) + (eB * g - (-)B) (8)
1 1
where a and B are the shares of the stock of domestic and foreign bonds
initially held by domestic citizens, so that the last term of the right
hand side of (8) represents flow of the net interest payments between the
two countries. Domestically owned wealth in real terms is
a - (M + aBg + eBB g ) 1 (9)
where it is assumed that households perceive government debt as wealth.
The demand functions for the two goods are
x.id = x.d (q,yd a) i=1,2 (10)1 1
There are only two financial assets: outside money and government bonds.
Their demand functions are
Md = 1L(y,a,i, e)
(11)
Bd = plJ(y,a,i, e)
Equations and definitions (1) - (11) are quite common to any macroeconomic
model.5 The original formulations of the different ways of analyzing the
balance of payments may easily be respecified in these terms. If the only
difference between absorption and monetarist approaches is that in the
first explicit disaggregation of savings among different assets was not
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given explicit consideration, having taken care of this "shortcoming" will
clearly eliminate any distinction.
Then the flow aspects of the monetarist model are introduced. Desired
demand for money and bonds as flows are
Md = plDL(y,a,i,r ) + e P L(y,a,i,7 )
(12)
d = plDJ(y,a,i, e) + e plJ(y,ai,e )
where D-d and 7e is the expected rate of inflation. As it can be seendt
they are derived from (11) where we made the assumption of initial stock
equilibrium. 6
The flow budget constraint for the whole country in real terms is
from eqs. (8) - (12)
+d  qx2d + DL(*) + DJ(-) + e[L(*) + J()] =
s s +L s + *g 1 Bg
Sx1 + qx 2  D +B - (G) + [eBB - (1-a)B
g ]  (13)
1 1
Equations (12) and (13) are the central point of the monetarist and
absorption models where excess demands for assets and goods do add up
in the flow budget constraint making possible the use of the Walras Law ,
[ 8 ].
The next step is to show under what conditions the money market
contains all the information necessary to judge the effect of changes
in the exogenous variables on the balance of payments. In other words
what we want to derive are the necessary conditions under which the
____LI*~_~lr _IM ~~_YI_~_ULLJILII -
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monetarist absoprtion is "correct." One small country with perfect capital
mobility and fixed exchange rates is assumed, therefore pl ,i,e are
predetermined. Then the only endogenous variable is q. In order to
determine it, following [ ], we assume that the market for non-traded
goods always clears
G + x2d (q,yd ,a) - x 2 (q) = 0 (14)
where mostly for sake of simplicity it is assumed that government buys
only home goods. Capital flows are defined as flow excess demand for
domestic bonds
Kf DJ(e) + eJ() (15)
K
Balance of payments definition is
BP E (x - xd) + K + i [( 1 -)B g  e ] (16)
which by (13) is equal to the flow excess demand of real cash balances
0 e e e D
BP = DL(y,a,i, e ) + Tr L(y,a,i,i e ) -
Then, following the literature, it is assumed that the adjustment of real
balances to the desired level is costly, such that it cannot be done
instantaneously. The flow demand for real cash balances is
MS
y[L(y,a,i, e) - 1 + re L (-) (17)
from (16) and (17) the expression for the balance of payments surplus in
nominal terms is
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BP = y[plL(y,a,i,e) - Ms] + rL(y,a,i,e) - DS (18)
which is basically the monetarist conclusion: everything that positively
affects demand for money, automatically improves the balance of payments;
increases in the rate of growth of the domestic money stock are "bad"
in the sense that they automatically worsen the balance of payments position.
In order for these conclusions to hold it has been necessary to assume:
(i) Continuous clearing of the market for non-traded goods; (ii) Flow
equilibrium in the money and bonds markets. Therefore, to have balance
of payments disequilibrium we need to have stock disequilibrium either in
the money market or in the bonds market. These conclusions have already
been stated,although in a different form, by H. Johnson[ 10 ]. This
description implies that persistent disequilibrium in the balance of
payments is caused by persistent stock disequilibrium in the assets markets
which instead are in general considered to adjust in short periods of
time. Then it would seem that this model provides an explanation of
short run disequilibria, but this does not agree very much with the
assumption of continuous full employment clearing in the non-traded sector.
It would seem, just to summarize the situation that we are in the short
run when we talk about balance of payments disequilibria being at the
same time in the long run on the real side of the economy. What is not
satisfactory in this model is the treatment of the assets markets. In
fact there does not seem to be any theoretical justification to equation
(17) whose specification is on the other hand necessary to avoid substantial
analytical difficulties. The presence of costs of adjusting an actual stock
to a desired one is justified in the case of the theory of investment by
the fact that firms' marginal costs rise with the rise of investment and
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this limits in the short run the firm's capability of achieving a certain
desired stock of capital. But when similar reasoning is applied to the
demand for money it is not clear what is meant.
In order to assess the effect of a devaluation in this model we
first notice that the assumptions of one country, stock disequilibrium
in the assets markets and free trade, imply that the domestic price level,
or in our units, the price of the traded good becomes a control variable.
Differentiating (7)
de _ dpl
e pl
dpl
being -- = 0 by assumption.
As a second step totally differentiate the non-traded goods market equili-
brium condition (14)
dA (62 d p l
dG + m 2 (dZ + dI - dT) + 6 dA (6 + m2 + (19)2 2 A 2 2 Pl (19)
q (F2 + 12)x2
where the symbol ~ denotes quantities in nominal level and where
x2
5  q
2 - q x2
2 q d > 0
x2
m > 0
2 d
ay
9x2 a d
2 - a d *x 2  > 0x2
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aB
I-
p1
denote respectively the elasticity of supply, the uncompensated elasticity
of substitution, the marginal propensity to spend on traded goods, the wealth
elasticity of consumption, interest payments on the shares of domestic
and foreign government debt owned by domestic citizens.
Expression (19) deserves the following remarks:
1. One of the mentioned criticisms to the traditional model concerned
the equilibrium assumptions underlying the Marshall-Lerner condition. The
same criticism holds with respect to this model. In fact to derive
expression (19) it was necessary to assume (a) equilibrium in the non-
traded goods sector before and after the devaluation; (b) production
always takes place on the production possibility frontier which implies
continuous full employment or instantaneous shift of resources from the
traded to the non-traded goods sector.
2. The relative price of home goods can change in consequence of a devalua-
tion only insofar as it acts as a capital levy on real wealth, on the
non-indexed part of the government deficit. This would create an excess
supply of the non-traded good and would require a decrease in its relative
price. Notice that if the excess demand were function only of relative
prices, the effect of a devaluation on the non-traded goods market would
be nil.
The third step is to differentiate totally equation (18) and to
substitute (19) into it.
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e DL [6 2 + m2 (Z + I)] dpldBP = (y+Tr) [(l-n)L(*) - ( + )1 +
Dy (E2 + fl 2 P1
+ y(dG + m2 (dZ + di - dT) + 6 ) dA
-1 +L dA s sP1* (2 a P - ydMS - d s  (20)
where
DL a eE a L and where we considered the variables i and e as constant
- a L(*)
denotes the real wealth elasticity of demand for real cash balances. The
condition for a devaluation to improve the balance of payments of the
devaluing country is then
6 2 
+ m 2 (Z + I)
+ [ ] < 1 (21)
where
DL 1-e _ -L -- > 0
Dy L y
The following remarks are worth making:
1. Even leaving aside the second member of the L.H.S. of (21), it is
not clear that a devaluation should cause a positive real balance effect on
the flow demand for money. Clearly once demand for money is specified as
function of real wealth, among other things, the result will depend on the
value of the elasticity with respect to this argument. The specification
of demand for money as a stock adjustment does not help in this sense: a
change in price changes both the actual and the desired real cash balances.
2. The distributional effects mentioned by Alexanderlare shown to work
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in a perverse sense. A devaluation decreases real disposable income of
owners of assets that are fixed in nominal value. As such it decreases
consumption and savings. This is perhaps the main distinction with the
monetarist model: once the separability assumption is dropped, savings,
demand for money and balance of payments surpluses can change not only
because of the real balance effect--which is transient--but even because
real disposable income changes.
3. Movements in the relative price of home goods in terms of the traded
ones are positively associated with movements in the balance of payments:
in fact, being full employment real income deflated by the traded
goods price, it will increase whenever q increases. This in turn will
increase the flow demand for money and therefore the balance of payments
surplus.
3
The two countries model
Before dealing with an alternative formulation of the balance of
payments problem it is worth extending the previous discussion to the
consideration of two countries. This will make it clear that there is no
difference between the elasticities, monetarist, absorption approaches,
at least with respect to the choice of the market relevant for
assessing the effects of a devaluation.
The flow budget constraint of the other country is
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d* * *d * * e* * *
x1 + q x2  + (DL + DJ ) + e* [L (*) + J (*)] =
s* * 8* i g
Sx + q x* + [(1-)B - eB +1 2 pl
pP
The excess demand functions for the second country are
* d* * d* * s* *
Ex 1 : x I  (q ,y ,a ) - x (q)
* d* * d* * s* *
2  x 2  (q ,y ,a ) - x2  (q)
* * e* -* D
EM DL(*) + L() 
-I 
--- eP1
E DJ () + 7e J( ) -
e
B i
Similar relationships hold for the home country; where
* i g *q
I [(l-a)B - eB ]
Pi
_i -[eBB - (1-a)B q ]
The world market equilibrium conditions are
E + Ex 0 (23)
E = 0 (24)
x2
E = 0 (25)
x
2
EM + EM = 0 (26)
EB + EB = 0 (27)
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where we retained the assumption of continuous equilibrium in the non-
traded goods markets in each country.
Due to the two budget constraints for the two countries one of
the above five equations is redundant. Thus we have four independent
equations in four variables q,q ,i,p1 or p1  --being one of the two
determined by (7). Which is the equation to be chosen as redundant?
This can be considered the trivial side of the debate elasticity vs.
monetarist approach: an elasticity theorist would choose the first
four eqs. emphasizing in such a way the traded goods market; a mone-
tarust would probably choose the last four, putting more emphasis on the assets mar-
kets. Clearly it does not make any difference which set of equations we choose--
provided we always maintain eqs. (24) and (25)--since any equilibrium
set of solutions satisfying the first four eqs. will satisfy the last
four.
Making use of the model expounded in the previous two sections we
now want to discuss some of the major results obtained by the monetary
analysis of the balance of payments. Unfortunately the greater complica-
tion of our model does not allow us to produce conclusions having the
same degree of unambiguity as those presented by previous authors.
The first step is to derive reduced forms of expressions for the endo-
genous variables of interest in assessing the effect of a devaluation
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on the balance of payments of the devaluing country. The tedious
algebraic part of the discussion is relegated to the Appendix. However,
it is worth pointing out that at least two alternative sets of assumptions
guarantee the results stated in Propositions (1) - (2). When differences
will arise in Proposition (3), they will be object of explicit
discussion. We have chosen to work with
A.1 [(y+ae )( 1 -n ) + (Y*+a )(l-n )] < 0
A.2 (nl - -m )Xl + m x 2 - all > 0
A.3 (TI - - ml)x + m1 x 2  a12 > 0
A.4 2  2 > LA.4 _ y
m
2
a L
A.5 all >___a 1 2  L
y
$2 >IT 1
A.6
m2
The first assumption says that the effect of a change in the price of
traded goods expressed in terms of the currency of the home country
either reduces the world flow excess demand for money, expressed in
terms of the same currency or leaves it unchanged. For positive ex-
pected rates of inflation this may imply values of the elasticities of
demand for money with respect to real wealth equal or bigger than one.
A.2 and A.3 are not very strong in the sense that neglecting initial
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quantities as it is often done in comparative statics they are automatically
satisfied. They say that the sum of the uncompensated elasticity of
demand for traded goods minus the elasticity of supply and the marginal
propensity to import traded goods--weighted by the initial quantities
of traded and non-traded goods--should be positive in both countries.
In this way the traded goods market appears explicitly in this monetary
model since we have chosen to work with the first four equations of
the system (23) - (27). A.4 relates substitution and income effects
in the non-traded goods market to substitution and income effects in
the money market. To understand A.4 imagine--everything else constant--
an increase in the relative price of non-traded goods in terms of traded
ones in the other country. This has a substitution effect creating
an excess supply of non-traded and an excess demand of traded goods.
But it has a positive income effect working in the opposite way in
the non-traded goods market and causing an excess demand for money.
However since the non-traded goods market has to clear all the times,
what is required is an increase in interest rate crowding out the
excess demand for money and diverting this into expenditure on non-
traded goods. A.4 says that substitution effects in the non-traded
goods market relative to income effects should be bigger than income
effects relative to substitution effects in the money market. A.5
tells a similar story for the traded goods market. Imagine a decline
in the relative price of non-traded in the home country and an increase
in the same price in the foreign country. What A.5 says is that
the home country should reduce expenditure on traded goods relative
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to the reduction in demand for money more than the foreign country's
increase in expenditure on traded relative to the increase in demand
for money. As a result demand for non-traded goods should raise
more in the home country than in the other country, given that demand
for bonds would decline in the home country, as a consequence of the
negative income effect caused by the decrease in the relative price
of non-traded in terms of traded goods, and would increase in the other
country on the same account. This would cause an excess flow supply
of bonds in the home country and a corresponding flow excess demand
in the other country, which would create a capital flow into the home
country. Finally A.6 relates income and wealth effects in both
commodity markets but does not seem to have any intuitive interpre-
tation. As a last point it is worth noting that A.1 - A.6 are necessary
although not sufficient to guarantee the local stability of the
system (23) - (27).
Proposition 1
Given A.1 - A.6, a devaluation lowers the relative price of non-traded
goods in terms of traded ones in the home country if
*A e* *
A.7 (y + r )(1 - rn ) : 0
A devaluation--everything else constant--causes a positive wealth
effect on the other country's demand for goods and money--if A.7 is
verified. It creates then an excess demand for money and traded goods
by the other country. These markets--everything else constant--can
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be cleared only at a lower domestic relative price of non-traded goods.
This in fact will induce a negative income effect that will reduce demand
for money in the home country and a substitution effect that will
reduce demand for traded and increase demand for non-traded goods.
As it had to be expected, having considered real income among the
arguments of the demand for money, makes much more ambiguous the
"reducing expenditure effect" of the devaluation, placing much
more emphasis on the substitution effect, along the classical lines.
Proposition 2
Given A.1 - A.7, a devaluation increases the price of traded goods
measured in terms of currency units of the devaluing country.
This obviously descends from the fact that the positive wealth effects
originated by the devaluation and increasing the other country's demand
for traded goods and money have to be offset by negative wealth
effects--in order to clear those markets after the devaluation--
such as those caused by a higher domestic price level.
Proposition 1 and 2 have been derived assuming 0 ' 0 and (y* + e*).
(l-n*) 1 0. The same propositions would have been valid--although
under an alternative set of assumptions--if we supposed 0 = 0 and
(Y* + e*)(l - n ) 1 0. However, the two possibilities show an
interesting difference.
Proposition 3
If a devaluation raises the price level with
0 < 0 and ( + e* (l - ) < 0
0 < 0 and (y + )(1- n) < 0
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or with
* e* *
E = 0 = (Y* + e )(1 - n )
a devaluation will raise the domestic price level of traded goods
measured in terms of currency units of the devaluing country less
than proportionately to the amount of the devaluation if
(y + e)(l - n) _ 0
If a devaluation raises the domestic price level with
* e* *
0 > 0 and (y + e*)(1 - n ) > 0
then it will have the same effect--a less than proportional increase--
only if
(Y + re)(l - n) > 0
However if a devaluation raises the price level in the intermediate
cases when
* e* *
0 > 0 and (y + e* )(1 - n ) < 0
=>(y + re)(l - n) > 0
or when
S< 0 and ( e* > 0
0 < O and (y + i )(1-n)>0
=>(y + , e )(l - n) < 0
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implying in both of these cases
I(Y + Te)(1 n) > I(* + -T e)
then a devaluation will increase more than proportionately the domestic
price level.
If we restrict our attention to the effect of the devaluation on
the equilibrium conditions in the money market, the interpretation of
the first two cases becomes rather easy.
In the first case the home country reduces its demand for money in
proportion (y + re)(l - n) of the positive change in the domestic price
level. The only way the money market can be in equilibrium after the
devaluation is if the other country increases demand for money. This--
everything else constant--is true only if the price level of the other
country falls after the devaluation. But this by the definition of
the exchange rate implies that the price level of the devaluing country
increases less than proportionately to the amount of the devaluation.
The same reasoning holds in the second case. The other two cases are
such that both countries increase or reduce their demand for money
at the same time. In this situation what is required to clear
the money market is an increase of the other country's prices level
too. But this by the definition of the exchange rate implies a more
than proportionate increase in the domestic price level of the devaluing
country.
Proposition 4
A devaluation may raise or lower the world interest rate. The
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effect is uncertain under any set of assumptions about the form of the
demand for money. This should be expected since, having considered
a perfectly integrated capital market, movements in the world interest
rate consequent to the devaluation would depend on the relative size
of the two countries' wealth elasticity of consumption of both goods
and demand for money.
The reduced forms of expression for the endogenous variables are
ap
= P1 (e ; 5) ; > 0
q = q(e ; ) < 0
e
ai >
i = i(e ; ) < 0
where E is a vector of exogenous variables.
The balance of payments of the home country is
A e
BP = y{pl(e;E)L[y[q(e;)], l i(e;E),7 -
- Ms + ep 1 (e;E)L[- ] - s  (18')
differentiating it with respect to e
eBP (Y + Te){L(*)(l-n) + ee y q + } i (28)
e/e e/e Dy Dq De/e Di e/e
Proposition 5
A devaluation does not necessarily improve the balance of payments
of the devaluing country. Even neglecting the effect of changes in
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interest rate that are of ambiguous sign, it can be seen from (28)
that the conditions for an improvement in the balance of payments
are much more stringent than those usually derived by the monetarist
model. In particular they amount to say that the wealth elasticity
of demand for money should be close to zero, and that the positive
stock-adjustment effect of the devaluation should be bigger than
the negative income effect. Although there is nothing that can a priori
exclude this possibility, it must be remembered that the stock-adjust-
ment effect is transitory by definition while the income effect, in
absence of other changes, is permanent. So that even if the premises
of the monetarist model were verified, we should expect an initial improve-
ment in the balance of payments in the period immediately after the
devaluation followed by a permanent worsening due to the negative
income effect on the demand for money.
5
In this section it is presented a different way of looking at the
balance of payments: not anymore as flow excess demand for money,
but simply as a definition. The two characteristics of the monetarist
model, disequilibrium in the assets markets and the flow budget constraint
are now replaced by the assumption of stock equilibrium and by a well
defined wealth constraint.
The assets markets are described by the following equilibrium
conditions
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B + d* = B (28a)
Bd* + d = B*g (28b)
Md = D s  (28c)
M*d = D*s (28d)
and by the wealth constraints
Bd + d + M = W (29a)
d* -*d d* *
B +B + M = W (29b)
~d *d
where B is domestic demand for foreign bonds, B is foreign demand for
domestic bonds and all the other variables are defined as before. Only
two of the equations (28) are independent. However--having considered
a single integrated capital market we now have five independent equations
(23) - (24), (25) and any two of (28) in only four unknowns. The last
assumption needed by this model is that one of the two independent
equilibrium conditions be satisfied for whatever values of q*,q,pl,i.
The main difference with respect to the previous model is that now in
absence of the flow budget constraint we must retain all three equations
(23) - (25) describing the commodity markets because there is no
guarantee that solutions satisfying eqs. (28) will satisfy (23) - (25)
being the last specified in terms of flows. In this way the traded
goods market is given explicit consideration and the various elasticities
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on this market become of interest in assessing the effect of a devaluation.
The balance of payments is just the definition (16) not being
directly related in this case to the flow excess demand for money.
Capital flows are defined as
.d*
KF B - B
where
d * * * * * e*
B = [p J (y ,a ,i,r) - B ]
.d
B = y[plJ(y,a,i, e ) - Bg ]
Trade deficit is in real terms
T E xd (yd,a,q) - qx1 s(q)
and net interest payments flows are
Si--(eBB*g - (1-a)Bg )
Pi
(28d) is chosen as the independent equation.
Proposition 6
If (1-n ) ' 0, and given A.2 - A.4 a devaluation lowers the rela-
tive price of the traded good in the devaluing country and it raises
it in the other country. Furthermore it raises the domestic price level
less than proportionately to the amount of the devaluation and it
increases the world interest rate.
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Therefore
BT (T a BT 1
= DT + D+ L) (30)De Pq De -p1 ee i D
aT
- = ((n1- 1-ml)x1 + mlx2 ) > 0
aTp = -(ml(Z + I) + 61) < 0
-T m (aBg + B * g ) > 0
Ai 1
Then if we exclude interest receipts a devaluation would unambiguously
decrease the trade deficit. However, a devaluation creates
positive excess demand for money in the world market, that, everything
else constant, can be cleared only at a higher interest rate. This
creates a positive income effect that may worsen the trade balance.
Differentiating the capital account, measured in terms of the domestic
price of traded goods, with respect to the exchange rate
K, P 1/P 1 * *
De/e = [B Y (1 - nB)- Bg (1 - e/e B*g [1 - nB +
*J DJ D- + i D DDJ DY Dq (31)
+ (Y I Y e/e + Y  * * De/e Yy q De/e
Dy 3q
where
* *
* aJ a
B g * and similarly for the other country,
B a B /pl
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are the wealth elasticities of demand for bonds. A devaluation affects
the capital account through three channels: a wealth effect, an interest
rate or substitution effect and an income effect. It unambiguously
improves the capital account balance through the last channel: the
decrease in real income in the devaluing country and the increase
in real income in the other country respectively reduce the domestic
flow demand for foreign bonds and increase the foreign flow demand for
domestic bonds. A devaluation would improve the capital account
balance through the other two channels if
nB > , B > 1 
(32a)
* 8J 8J
Y i Y (32b)
The interpretation of (32a) descends from the definition of capital
flows. They arise from the existing gap between desired demand and
available stock of domestic bonds. Desired demand is among other things
a function of real wealth. Following a devaluation, wealth and the
available stock of domestic bonds in real terms, decrease in the
same proportion as the increase in the price of traded goods in the
devaluing country and conversely in the other country. Only if desired
demand for domestic bonds decreases more than proportionately to the
change in real wealth, i.e., nB > 1, and conversely in the other
country, domestic flow demand for foreign bonds would decrease and
foreign flow demand for domestic bonds would increase. (32b) is just
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a condition relative to the size of the two countries and it is of
obvious interpretation.
The effect of a devaluation on net interest flows is not of
particular interest as it depends on the initial holdings of domestic
and foreign bonds.
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Conclusion
The monetarist analysis of the balance of payments rests on the
assumptions of : (i) an underlying utility function which is separable
between commodities and money; (ii) the existence of an unambiguously
positive real balance effect on the flow demand for money; (iii) the
existence of a flow budget constraint for the whole economy such that
an excess demand for traded goods is equal to a flow excess supply
of money. The main implication of these assumptions is what used to
be called "classical dichotomy," although in a particular form:
demands for goods can change if their relative prices change or if
out of a given real income savings increase with respect to expenditure.
In the first three sections of the paper the flow structure of
the monetarist model has been retained but the other two assumptions
have been dropped. It has been shown taht a devaluation affects the
domestic price level and the relative price of non-traded goods in
terms of the traded ones in the same way as it does in the monetarist
model. However given the different specifications of the demand
functions for goods and for assets, the channels through which a devalua-
tion works are different from the monetarist model. In particular
it has emphasized the fact that since demand for money is a positive
function of real income and real wealth, changes in relative prices or
in the absolute price level--such as those caused by a devaluation--
that decrease real income and real wealth may decrease the flow demand
for money and therefore may not improve the balance of payments of the
devaluing country.
The second question to which we tried to answer was: Does the
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flow excess demand for money contain all the information necessary to
judge the effect of a devaluation?" or, in other words, "Was the
emphasis placed by classical authors on the traded goods market a
misplaced one?" The answer provided was in two parts :
(i) In a general equilibrium model the equilibrium values of the
endogenous variables are jointly determined by all the markets. We
could have indifferently excluded by the Walras-Law the world money
market or the traded goods market without this affecting in any
substantial way the nature of the equilibrium solutions. It is true
that we have chosen the flow demand for money as the expression of
the balance of payments into which to substitute the reduced form
expressions for the endogenous variables, but we could have done the
same with the other side of the country's budget constraint which is by
definition the balance of payments. Again there is no difference.
(ii) However, the difference arises where the assets markets
are described as being in continuous stock equilibrium. In this case--
closer to the IS-LM type of framework--we can still neglect the money
market in virtue of the wealth constraint, but we must retain all
the markets for commodities traded and non-traded.
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Appendix
Part I
Eqn. (23) is
* d d s d* * d* * s* *
Ex + E x x (q,y ,a)- x I (q) + x1  (q ,y ,a ) - x (q) =0
1+ E1 X1
d* s* * * * * Z i (-a)B g*
where y 1  (q ) + q x1  (q )+ p + (1-)B ) +
* * (1-a)B g* 1
a (M + + (1-B)B )
P1
Totally differentiating eqn. (23)
C ) *I * * * * dq
[(l - - ml)Xl + m1 x2 ] + [( 1  - - m )x1  + m2 x2 ] q
S* B * * * * dp 1
+ (mlB + m B )di - (ml(Z + B) + m (Z + B ) + 6 + 6 ) +
+ (m (Z +B)+ 6 de 01 e
where all the other exogenous variables have been assumed constant
where
d
as
s 1 _ > 0
1 - q x1
xl
E - aq x < 0
d3x
m - > 0
1 d
y
B (aBg + B ) > 0
d
l a
6 -x- > 01 Ba x I
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and similarly for the other country.
Since now on the following definitions will be introduced
[(nI - - ml)x1 + m lx2 ] - all
[(n - El - m )x + m x ] - a12
1  1  1 1  1  2  12
-[ml(Z + B) + ml (Z + B) + 61 + 61 < 0
(mlB + m i B ) =  1 < - Y
and it will be assumed that
all > 0 , a1 2 > 0
which correspond to A.2 and A.3 in the text.
Eqn. (23) is
Ex 2 - q + x 2 d (q y ,a) - x 2 (q) = 0
totally differentiating it, assuming all the exogenous variables, but
the exchange rate, to be constant
S- E )x 1 Bdi2 2 2 q 2 Pl m2Bdi
where
d
2 < 0
-q x2
x
2 q x2d
x
2
m2 d2 y
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2 - 62 + m2 (Z + B)
Similarly for the other country, from eqn. (24)
Sd* dpl * de *
(* * * - E -x + de + m Bdi = 0
2 2 2 * 2 p 2 e 2q 1
Eqn.(25) in real terms is
e M N s * * * 
* e M*s
y[L(y,a,i, ) P + r L(-) - Ds + y [L (y ,a ,i, ) - -- e] +
1 1
e* * **s
+ r eL () -D =0
We totally differentiate this equation, assuming all the exogenous
variables other than the exchange rate constant
(Y + pe){[q -x2 q + + 1(- a P P1Sy 2 q a P+- 1
* * * *s dp
* e* *DL dq +DL DL * dPM 1
*s
3L * M de
+ ( a )P =
Da 1
(Y + ,e)L d (Y+ e)L * dq + [(Y + d + ( + Ti +y q y q *) * A
q
P 1+[(y + e)(l n) + (Y* e* n P
* *e* de
- (y + )(1 - ) -e
where
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L e
L q x (y + T e ) > 0
TL a * e*
n - (Y + ) > 0
Ma S/P1
and we define
6a [(Y + 7e)( 1 - n) + (y* + e*)(1 - n )] < 0
( + L * Le* 
((y + T e + (Y + e * ) y- < 0i of endogenous variables isi
The matrix of the coefficients of endogenous variables is
all a 1 2
(e2-n2)
0 (E 2 - 2 )
-m2 B
y
The minors of the corresponding determinant are
*1* *
Al l = {-92m 2 B L - 6(E2 S2 )m2B + m 2 B 2 Ly - (E 2 - n2)2} >< 0
* * * * * *
A = {a l X - m B lL + 6( 2 - n )p -12 12 2 2 l y 2 2
- L y 2 p + m2 B Oa 1 2 1(2 - 2 ) > 0
dq/q
dq /q
dp1/P1
di
- 1
2
*+ e* *-
(Y +Tr )(1-n )
-m2B
-92-
A3 = {a1 2  - ~m 2 BL -L P+mBea }> 013 12 2 1 2 y y 2 2 12 <
A14 = {-a12 2m2 B - lm2B(E2 - 2)  +
+ m2Bg2 a1 2 } < 0
The Jacobian of the partial derivatives of the endogenous variables is
A = [allAll - (E2- 2)A12- LyA14] (1)
ist Case: e 0
it can be seen that A>0 if the following conditions are satisfies
A.2 all 0
A.3 a2 = 0
A.4 2 -n 2  L *
=2
m 2
A.5 all L
= *
a1 2  L
y
A.6 12 > 1T
m2
where we set the initial holdings of bonds equal to i.
- 2 - (2
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2nd Case: 6>0
A<0 if (A.2) - (A.6) are not true, their opposite holds and if
> - 2
A'.6 (E2-n2)
Proof of Proposition 1
de/e = {- All + 2 A 3 - (Y + e )(1 - n )A
* e* *
ist Case: 680, (y + e )(1 - n ) < 0
(A.2) - (A.6) guarantee that A11 >0, A1 3<0, A14<0, A>0
so that
dq/q < 0
de/e
2nd Case: 0>0, (6* e*)(l- ) > 0
2nd Case: 6>0, (6 + v )(1- n ) >0
(2)
the opposite of (A.2) - (A.6) and A'.6 guarantee that A11 <0, A1 4>0 and
A.8 > 2
= P2
guarantees that A 3<0, so that de/e 013 d/
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Proof of Proposition 2
dp 1 /P 1
de/e
1{a A' - - I )A' - L A' I
11 11 2 2 12 y 14
A +e* * * * * *
A' = {-(y + e*)(- n )(2 - 2 )m 2 B + 2 m2BL
A' 1 2  {a 12 2 X + 1 m 2 B L + (y + e*)(1 - n )(E22 =2 y
(3)
- 2 )p -
- L 2 + (Y + e)(1 - n )m2 Ba12 + 1X(E1  - 2 )}Y 22 
A' 14 = m2B(E2
Ist Case:
- * 2 ) + 2 m2Bal2
* e* *
6=0, (y + e )(1- n )
(A.2) - (A.6) allows to say
< 0
dp1/P1
de/e
* e* *
2nd Case: 0>0, (y + r e)(l - n ) > 0
the opposite of (A.2) - (A.6) guarantee the same result.
Proof of Proposition 3 to see if a devaluation increases the domestic
price level more or less than proportionately it is necessary to compare
the numerator and the denominator of (3). This proposition follows
then by inspection of
[all(Al - A' 1 1)- ( 2 - n2 )(A 12 - A' 12) - Ly(A1 4 - A' 14)]
____I____WLL ~I_~_~_~_~~___1~11_~
* e* *
under alternative assumptions about values of 6 and (y + e )(l - n ).
Proof of Proposition 4
di { A" - (A" - LA"}de/e A 11 1 2 2 12 y 14
* * * * e* *A" 1 1 = {L 2 2 - (1 - n )(y + )i(E 2A"1  y 2  2 2 2
A" = {al22 (y + e*)(l- n ) + Y1 2 L
+ 1 2 Ly -2 Oa12
0
- T2)}
- 0( 2 - n 2 +
- 1(E2 - n2 )
A"1 4 = {a1 2 2 "12  + 122 - 2 )
Part II
The matrix of coefficients of endogenous variables is now
all2-1 1
E2-)2
a1 2
0
0 (2 
- 2 )
(1-n )
-m2 B
-m 2 B
L.
1
dq/q
dq /q
dp 1 /P 1
di
- *
1
0
(2
The minors of the correspondent Jacobian are
--- ---- -----~-i
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** * * * *
All = {-m 2 B 2L - (1- n )(2 -2 )m2B +
+ m2 B 2 L- 2 - 2 )Li }
A12 = {a12 2 Li
** * * * *
- m2 B Y1L + (1 - )(E 2 - 2)-
- Ly + (1 - n )m2 B a12 - (E - 2 L }
In this part of the appendix we will always assume: (1 - n ) 1 0
it can be seen that an assumption parallel to (A.4) in the previous
model
A.4' E2 - n2
*
L
y
is enough to give a positive sign to the Jacobian
J = [allA
11
- (E2 - 12 )A1 2 ] > 0 (II.1)
Proof of Proposition 6
dg/g* * * 1
de/e {- 1Al+ AI 3 - - )A 1}-
de/e 2 13 14 A
A13 = {a1 2 2 Li - 1m 2 BL - Ly 2 + m2B(l - n )a12}
A14 = {-a12 2m2 B - m2BY1 (2 - 12 ) - (E2 - n2 ) 2 + m2B 2 a1 2}
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A 13<0, by (A.6) and A1 4<0 by (A.6) and if
(2 _ '2
dele < 0
de/e
dq = {*/a A'
de/e A 11 11 - (2 - i2)A'12
}
** * * *
A'11 {-2m2 B (1 - ) - 2 - 2 Li }
SA'1 ( - 1 * * * *
A'12 = B"Li - m2  T1( - n ) - 1 m2 B (1- n ) - Y1Lic 2
* *
In the case (1 - ) 0, dqe/ > 0 unambiguously; in the other casede/e
the sign is uncertain.
dp1 /P1  1 * * ,m
de/e = +all[-(1 - n )(2 2 )m 2 B + m 2B2 Ly ]} -
(P2 - 12)[Li 2 a 2 + 1 m2 B L + (1 - )(E 2 n2 )-
- PLy * 2 + m 2 B (1 - )a1 2 + 1 (G2 - 2 )Li]
if n 1 i,
dP 1/P 1
> 0 unambiguously.
de/e
if n < 1i, sign is uncertain.
~~I _ LI ____pLllj_____((_~__-- I.I~
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di 1 * * * *de/e =  ( all (y22 - (E2 - n2 )1 - 0 )) -de/e A {a1 1 (L y 2 2  (2 T2  -2 q
- 2 Ti[al2 L  - 1 (E 2  - 2 )(- n ) +
+ $1 2 Ly - 2 a 1 2 - (2 - 2 )1(1 - n )
if > di > 0 unambiguously; otherwise the sign is uncertain.de/e
by inspection of the unmerator and the denominator of de/e it can
be seen that if (A.4') is true a devaluation will raise the domestic price
level less than proportiorately to the amount of the devaluation.
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Footnotes
1. To exclude the possibility of unemployment or of trading out of
equilibrium is indeed a major limitation of this type of analysis.
Unfortunately as it is well known the consideration of more than one
good in the presence of unempoloyment makes the analysis extremely
difficult. For instance, within the present context of an open economy
the key question would be "which would be the new allocation of ex-
cesses supply of goods and labor among different industries, once the
devaluation is enacted?" Unless arbitrary allocation rules are
assumed as it is done for example in Ch. XIV of [3] or in the Keynes-
Wicksell monetary growth models [6], to answer this question seems at
the present stage hopeless.
2. For "the monetarist model of the balance of payments" it is meant
that body of economic literature which has its foundations in the works
of Mundell [12, 13], Johnson (9], Dornbusch [4, 5], Negishi [14].
3. See Morishima [11] for a discussion of the concenpt of separability
between consumption and savings decisions.
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5. A price index would have certainly been more appropriate than just
choosing the price of one of the two goods as unit of measure. However,
the degree of arbitrariness would have been reduced only insofar as
there exists an unambiguous way of assessing the relative weight of the
two goods in the representative basket. The choice of the price of the
traded good has the satisfactory implication of assuming absence of money
illusion following a devaluation and therefore seems appropriate for an
"open" economy.
6. For the derivation of the flow demand for assets (12) see Foley [7].
7. See Dornbusch op. cit.
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Short run Stabilization Policy and Long run Economic Plans-
by Mario Draghi
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
February 1975
The optimal growth literature is primarily concerned [5,6] with a
description of an economy in which the planner chooses certain levels of
consumption per man or certain capital-labor ratios, or a certain distribu-
tion in the ownership of private and public capital,2 so as to maximize a
utility function defined in the above arguments or in any of their combinations.
When an optimal plan exists, it can be achieved either by brute force, choosing
exogenously one of the control variables [1,10] or through the use of some
policy instruments under the planner's control [2].
The underlying models are more or less elaborate versions of the
Solow 1956 growth model [12]. As such, all the results derived by this
type of model hold in the long run, regardless of the horizon chosen by
1These references obviously do not intend to be exhaustive of the
whole literature.
2All the following arguments will be based on the assumption of a
single existing capital good. The results obtained in such a way do not
depend at all on the theory of distribution that may be derived from models
making this assumption.
* I am grateful to Professor R.M.Solow for lenghty discussions and helpful
comments. I also wish to thank P.A.Samuelson, Glenn Loury and other members
of the M.I.T. Advanced Economic Theory Workshop for their suggestions.
I will obviously retain resposibility for the remaining errors.
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the planner. The so-called "short run" aspect of the economy characterized
by non market clearing conditions and by variable unemployment rates is not
discussed by this literature. As a consequence policies that are optimal
in the long run may not be optimal for short run stabilization purposes.
Two explanations may tentatively be offered for this lack of practical
usefulness of timal growth models. One is that there may be an implicit
assumption that the political environment where the planner acts resembles
more closely a stalinist economy where a private sector following a keynesian
type of short run behavior just does not exist. An alternative implicit
assumption might be that the solutions originated by these models should serve
as "benchmarks" for the short run stabilization policy models.
But if this were the case they should be used as such in this last type
of model. Instead policy simulations in the largest econometric models [ ]
are generally studied under the assumption that the full employment-full capacity
utilization--however defined--level of GNP is either a constant or a known
exponential function of time, in both cases exogenously determined without
any consideration of the preferences of the policy maker.
If this suggestion were followed we would discover that there are
constraints on the policy variables such that either the long run or the
short run problem as they have been traditionally formulated may not have
a solution. For example, the tax rate necessary to achieve a certain level
of consumption per man at a given number of years from now may prove to be
completely destabilizing in the next six months.
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The purpose of this paper is to offer a qualitative description of the trade
off ---when it exists--between policies that are optimal in the short run
but not in the long run and vice versa. The reason for this is both
practical and theoretical. What is called in common language the trade-off
between reforms and stabilization policies has always been an open problem
especially in dual economies. What usually happens in this type of
economies is that policies aimed at growth of the backward sector are
sacrificed--for instance because of a negative reaction of private
investments--in favor of day-to-day stabilization of total aggregate demand.
The usual argument being that growth in the poor part of the country cannot
be promoted starting from an unemployment situation in the developed part of
the country. The theoretical reason refers to a remark by Koopmans [ 6]
noting how some assumptions crucial for the existence of a solution in the
optimal growth problem--the choice of the planner's preference ordering--
were unverifyable and somehow empty of an intuitive meaning. The simultaneous
consideration of the short and the long run problem will show that the conditions
usually assumed on the Central Planning Board's (C.P.B.) utility function,
in order to guarantee existence and uniqueness of the solution, have indeed
economic meaning.
The outline of the paper is the following: in the first section an
example considered representative of the current literature on optimal
stabilization policies will be stated; in the second and the third section an
alternative formulation will be suggested. The two final sections are devoted
to a discussion of what a reformist planner could do when facing a short
run stabilization problem.
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1. The short run economy
The optimal stabilization policy literature is usually concerned [11,13]
with the design of an optimal control of the feedback type, keeping actual
aggregate demand "close enough" to some predetermined level of full
employment GNP.
Consider the classical Phillips stabilization policy problem [7,8]:
(1) D(t) = cy(t) + I(t) + g(t)
(2) I(t) = cy(t) - kI(t)
(3) y(t) = r[D(t) - y(t)]
Eliminating D(t) and I(t)
(4) Y(t) + bl;(t) + b2 y(t) = rg(t) + -g(t)
b = r(l-c) + - ar1 k
r(l-c)
2 k
where D(t) is aggregate demand, I investment, g government expenditure, y
GNP. All magnitudes are in real terms, price level will be considered since
now on a constant.
The state representation of (4) is
4Money upply will therefore not be explicitly considered. There is only
one type of leng run interest bearing bond Bg describing government debt.
A tax rate can easily be included--and this will be done at a later stage--
in (1) through (3), provided it is by now treated as a constant.
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x (t) = y(t)
x 2 (t) = y - rg(t)
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) (5)
X 0 1 rI
x(t) = ; A = ; B =
x -b -b r b
2 2  1(k 1
The following assumptions will be made:
A.1 A and B are time invariant
A.2 The representation (5) is completely controllable, i.e.,
rank [B * AB] = 2
A.3 The representation (5) is completely observable
A.4 (5) is zero state bounded input, bounded output stable.5
What is called the "output function" of this system is not of particular
interest from an economic point of view, because no attempt is made in these
models of distinguishing between changes in aggregate demand and changes
in supply. Anyway, in view of A.3 and A.4, substituting (2) into (1)
D(t) = cy(t) + cy(t) = ki(t) + y(t) (1')
y(t) = r[cy(t) + a;y(t) - ki(t) + y(t) - y(t)] (3')
D(t) = y(t) - + y(t)
r
5For a discussion of existence, uniqueness and stability of the optimal
policies in this type of problem see [31.
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is the output function or in state form
D(t) = x2 (t) - + u(t) + x l(t (6)
2  1
when the state is driven to zero by the control g(t), D(t) = x2 (t).
Following the usual practice, let's redefine all the variables
of (5) as deviations from some predetermined equilibrium values, considered
constant through time.
xi(t) = x.i (t) - Y.
9(t) = g(t) - - (7)
The planner in the short run, minimizes
1 1J = [x'(T)Fx(T)] + / [x'(t)Qx(t) + g(t)Rg(t)]d t (8)
t
0
Q and F are 2 x 2 positive semidefinite matrices.
R is a strictly positive scalar matrix.
The optimal control is
g(t) = -R- 1 B'K(t)x(t) (9)
The matrix Riccati equation is
K(t) = -K(t)A - A'K(t) + K(t)BR- 1 B'K(t) - Q (10)
with boundary condition
K(T) = F
The optimal pxojectory of the state is
x(t) = [A - BR- 1 B'K(t)] x(t) (11)
with the boundary condition
x(to) = o
4 - Solutions of (11) will give the optimal px~-jectory of D(t) in (6).
What makes this problem, the way it has been discussed, not terribly
interesting from an economic point of view, are the following facts:
4 (a) The business cycle described in equations (1) through (3) is of a
linear fashion and is deterministic: once the state is driven to zero
there is nothing that creates new cycles such as those we observe in reality;
(b) The control g(t) is treated as if it were unconstrained. In fact it
obeys the government budget constraint.
g(t) = T(t) + Bg(t) - rB g  (5')
where the notation is the usual one. If T, Bg are already determined by
outside considerations it is quite possible that an optimal control does
not exist.
(c) The method of redefining the state variables as deviations from
some constant a priori determined desired value can be justified only if
those equilibrium levels do not change through time, are not affected by
the control and do not affect the present value of the control. This
is in a certain sense the essence of what is called in the control literature
"the state regulator problem." As we shall see if we allow those desired
values to change through time, the structure of the problem becomes sensibly
- 12 -
~d
Z = (l-x)(Z + iB )  (25)
x = x(Z + iB g ) (26)
c = (1-s)Zd (27)
p
c = g (28)
S+ + nBg = g + iBg  (29)
cd * gZ - c = k + nk - x + rB (30)
p g M
where Zd is disposable income, x the income tax rate, x* total tax
collection, cp private consumption, s the constant marginal propensity
to save, c is social consumption, B is the change per unit of time of
the stock of government bonds. Time subscripts have been suppressed for
the sake of clarity and all magnitudes are measured in per capita terms.
Finally notice that (29) and (30) together imply portfolio equilibrium
for the private sector and that this with the assumption of perfect capital
markets and of perfect substitutability of bonds with capital implies
fk(') = i (31)
The planner is assumed to
max f e u[c (t), c (t)]dt (32)
{c ,x} 0
g
u(*) strictly concave
subject to (29), (30) and to the transversality conditions
- 13 -
-At
lim e p(t) > 0
t->-o
lim e g(t) > 0 (32')
t-*oo
-At
lim e p(t)k(t) = 0
t-+o
lim e-t g(t)Bg(t)= 0
t-*o
The current value Hamiltonian is
H(*) = u(c c g) + p[sd + x(Z + iB g ) - iB - g - nk] +
q[g + iB g - nBg  - x(2 + iBg)] (33)
where p and g are the auxiliary variables corresponding to the transition
equations (29) and (30).
The optimal tax rate and government expenditure are determined by8
8H
x = 0 = -(l-s)ul( ) + p(l-s) - q
l[(l-s)(l-x) (Z + iB)g] = p - s)
aH
ac 2
u2[(1-s)(l-x)(Z + iB g ) , c ] = p - q (35)
8Concavity of H*(*) = max H(.) in the state variables with the tran-
versality conditions (32') have to be satisfied in order for an optimal to
exist. Concavity of u(.) and f(.) implies concavity of H(') and it can be
seen that this implies concavity of H*(-) in the state variables.
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The movement along the optimal path is governed by
p = (X+n - f'(k))p + q(f'(k) - f"(k)Bg )  (36)
= (A+n)S (37)
and by the differential equations (29) and (30).
The optimal tax rate and the optimal amount of government expenditure
are obtained solving (34) and (35) in x and c . Uniqueness of the
g
solutions in x and g is warranted by the strict concavity assumption.
So that we have a simultaneous system of 2 static equations (34) and (35),
and 4 autonomous differential equations (29), (30), (36), and (37) in 6
variables x(t), c (t), p(t), g(t), k(t), Bg(t). Solving this system the
planner will now obtain the optimal time paths of the instruments as functions
at each instant of time of the state and costate variables and he will derive
the optimal time path of the GNP, to be used in (15) for short run
stabilization purposes.
Before proceeding with the analysis of the optimal growth policy
it is necessary to establish two properties of the nonlinear system (25)
through (30):
p.1 The system (25) through (30) is controllable. Since the planner
has three instruments, equations (29) through (30) can be solved for each
pair of the three. In particular once the optimal income tax rate and the
desired amount of social consumption are chosen, they will determine the
change per unit of time in the stock of government bonds. Therefore, the
optimal policy is always controllable.
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p.2 The system (25) through (30) is controllable with stable instruments
deriving from (29) and (30) the portfolio equilibrium condition for the whole
economy and solving for Bg
S= s c - ( + nk) - nBg  (38)
l-s p
If the optimal policy is such that c and k converge to some finite limits and
k converges to zero--and the optimal policy satisfies this condition [9]
the first two terms of the right-hand side converge to a finite limit and
since n > 0 any solution is stable from the instruments point of view.
4. The tying up
The two problems--of motion along the optimal path, and recovery
from unemployment-- have been treated quite separately until now, their
only link being the tracking equation (15). If this were really the case
the C.P.B. could choose at time 0 a series of values of g(t) that at
each point in time minimize (13) and stick with this policy for whatever
is the horizon taken into consideration. In this section it is shown
that this is not the case.
At time 0 the C.P.B. faces the following situation: there is a certain
ratio of utilized capacity to employed labor force k0; then there is a certain
potential full employment capital-labor ratio k0 . The C.P.B. on the basis
of k0 computes the optimal long run path that maximizes (32), the optimal state
at time 0 Z(O), and the policies that would be optimal if the system were
at full employment. Then solving the Riccati equation and the tracking
equation the C.P.B. finds the optimal g(0). As a by-product of this
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computation, from the two budget constraints (5') and (29) the C.P.B.
obtains the additional information of how much the rate of change of Bg
differs from the rate of change that there would be along the optimal
path.
Now comes the question of actual implementation: if the C.P.B.
implements the policy optimal for problem (13), it will bring the system
close to some full employment-full capacity utilization state at that
point in time, but it will never achieve the combination of social and
private consumption prevailing on the optimal path. In fact, implementation
of g(t) will, among other things, stimulate net private investments and
will produce a new initial condition, say k (1), that will differ from
the k(l) belonging to the previous optimal path becau'se this was
achievable only through implementation of the policies optimal for problem
(32).9 This implies a new round of computations of the new desired state
Z*(t+l) and through (15) of the new value of the optimal control g*(t+l).
But as a practical implication this means that there will always be a
problem of stabilization and there will never be room for actually
achieving the desired combination of private and social consumption.
On the other hand, if instead the C.P.B. implements the policies
optimal from a long run point of view in the sense that their computation
assumes an economy at full employment and full capacity utilization, two
possible outcomes are possible. The first is that this will destabilize the
economy described by equation (5), producing lower and lower levels of
utilization of capital and labor and therefore departing further and
further from the optimal path. The other is the opposite outcome: at some
9Obviously k(1) cannot be reached by any other policy by definition
of optimality.
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point in time--obviously after T, the terminal time of problem (13)--the
time path (5) is not only stable but it will converge to the optimal
path. In fact, if the C.P.B. implements the policies optimal for (32),
a situation in which the economy is in full employment but not on the
turnpike is impossible.
To answer this question, first the optimal policies for (32) have
to be computed.
Totally differentiating equations (34) and (35)
_U1 1Z p 1 U1 2  dx 11
-u 21 8 u 2 2 dg u 21
-u llf' (k)
-u 21f'(k)21
1-s
1 -1
dk 7
dB
dp
dg
A = (-ullu 2 2 + ul2u 2 1)Z p < 0
because by assumption u(c p,c ) is strictly concave
BE (1-x)(l-x) > 0
a f'(k) + f"(k)Bg <
and solving for the optimal instruments
Ullu22 + Ul2U21)a*8
= (k) >
= 5f'(k) > 0
dx
dk
dx (
dB
(39)
(40)
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dx u22 12 (41)(41)dp A
dx -u 2 2 /(1-s) + u12 (42)dq A
dg (U11 21 - U 21) z p 2aS-A(43)dk A
dg = 0 (44)
dB
dg = (-U11+ u 2 1 )Z *B
dp A
dg = (u1 - u 2 1 /(1-s))Z (46)11 21 p (46)dq A
If,(i), Public and private consumption are complementary everywhere
and, (ii), increases in the capital labor ratio do not increase interest
payments on the oustanding per capita stock of government debt more than
they increase per capita output, i.e., a > 0, then
x*(t) = x (k(t), p(t), q(t), Bg(t))
(47)
g (t) = g (p(t), q(t)) (47)
x 1 > 0, x 2 > 0, x*3 < O, x > 0
q* 1 < 0, g*2 > 0
The sign of these derivatives--under the assumption of sufficiently
accurate local approximation--is of importance for asserting the stability
of the short run economy when the optimal policies are actually implemented.
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The next step is to modify the short run model in order to take
explicitly into account a tax rate and a government expenditure varying
through time. Furthermore we have to allow for the introduction of interest
bearing debt. Consequently
yp = y + iB
d = (1-x)yp
where yp and yd are the actual personal and disposable income. Then, since
the optimal policies (47) are expressed in per capita terms, it is necessary
to normalize by the same terms the short run model
S-nt g -nt - -nt
y nte B = B.e I = ent I
p p
Consequently we have the following definitions
0 0
-d
y (1-x)(yp + ny) -xyp p p
The short run model can be rewritten as
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- -dD= cy + I + g (1')
d -dI= a(y + ny ) - B(I + nI) (2')
-dy = ny = r(D - y ) (3')
- -g -g (5")
x y + B + nB = g + iB (5")
where x* and g* are now the optimal policies as derived in (47). The
question we want to ask is: What happens to the system (1') through (5")
when policies {x*,g } are actually implemented? Equations (1') through
(3') can be reduced to
y + bly + b 2 (t)y + (b(t) + b (t))y r g(p(t),q(t)) + g(p(t),q(t)) (6')1 (pp 3 4
1
b E r(2n +-)1 rB
b2(t) - (1- c- )(1-x (k(t),p2q(,q(t),Bg(t))
b3 (t) E -(1 - c -)x(.)
a- n (l-c)()
b (t) - r[n(l-x)(l - c - ) + r (1-x)
The following features of eqn.(6') are worth being noticed:
a) Since the optimal policies have the characteristic that as time goes
to infinity they converge to finite limits, g('), x (-), and therefore b,
will converge to 0--being eqns. (29), (30), (36), (37) and (6') a system
of autonomous differential equations [4] --- and x*(-) and g(*) will converge
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to finite limits. The other coefficients are still positive. Therefore
introduction of policies {x (.),g.)}I optimal for problem (32) but sub-
optimal for problem (13) did not affect the stability of the time path
of actual per capita output y(t).
b) However, just because {x*(*)A')} are non-optimal from the stabilization
point of view, it is not obvious that they should eliminate even after T--
the short run planning horizon--the original decrease in aggregate demand that
started the business cycle described by (6"). If this happens at the
steady statel0, not only would savings equal investments at a level below full
employment, but the desired composition of social and private consumption
would not be achieved, being policies {x (.),g(.)} optimal only conditionally
to a state of full employment. Then the stationary solution of (6")
becomes of interest
2- --do a) ny + (l-c)y r g +
+[n Y  ny (1 -c- ) + + ] = ng (48)
where the symbol o denotes the limit value. Are there conditions that make
(48) equal to 0 and such that they are automatically satisfied on the
11
long run optimal path? It can be seen that (48) can be rewritten as
1 0It is clear that (6") cannot have a stationary state solution at a
' date other than that at which the system (29) through (37) has a steady state
solution too.
S11 ee Appendix Note II.
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sy = n(k + Bg  )  (48')
The pair of policies {x (-),g(*)} optimal for problem (32) is
not destabilizing in the short run and fully eliminates the initial
decrease in aggregate demand. Moreover, differently from the alternative
strategy described in section (2) , the economy once stabilized is
automatically on the turnpike. In fact (48') satisfies the necessary
and sufficient conditions for this to happen:
1) It is always verified at the steady state so that (48) is satisfied
-- do
at y = 0, which implies full employment-full capacity utilization;
2) This is the result not of any policy but of the implementation
of the pair {x *(), gt-)} optimal for (32);
3) (48') is the condition of portfolio equilibrium and as such is
always satisfied on the optimal path.
How will private investment and government debt behave on the
transition path from unemployment to the full employment turnpike? Comparing
the government budget constraints of the two economies (5") and (30) we
see that since the planner adopts policies {x *(), g-)} on the short un
path, the tax rate and government expenditure will be the same; on the
other hand, y < z by definition, therefore
g + (n-i)- g > g + (n-i)Bg  (49)
on the transition path government debt will grow at a rate faster than
that on the optimal path for any given initial level of per capita stock
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of government debt.
Then writing an expression similar to (38') for the short run
economy and subtracting it from (38')12
(Bg - B- g ) + n(B g - B- g ) + (k - k) + n(k - k) =  s(c - c ) + u (50)
Since private consumption is an increasing function of disposable
income it will be smaller on the transition path than on the optimal
path. This together with (49) and (50) will imply that for any given initial
level of the capital stock and stock of government bonds, private invest-
ments will be lower on the path approaching the turnpike than on the
turnpike itself.
1 2
See Appendix Note III.
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5. Conclusions
Stabilization policies are generally defined as a set of actions taken
by the government in order to achieve certain desired values. In a one period
world the description of how these policies work is accomplished by the
static IS-LM model. But when this description is abandoned and the dynamic
behavior of the economy becomes of interest, the horizon chosen, the
optimality criteria need to be redefined and consequently the problem has
to be reformulated. As far as concerns the horizon to choose, a short run
economy is defined for descriptive purposes: where the short run as distinct
from the static momentary equilibrium, is characterized by variable
unemployment and capacity utilization rates, and by adjustment lags, such
that they would produce dynamic behavior of a business cycle type.
As an introductory exercise the problem of finding optimal stabilization
policies in this linear model is discussed. This formulation is found
unsatisfactory for several reasons that can be summarized by saying that
it is not justified to specify some kind of dynamic behavior for one
variable of the model without doing the same for the other variables. In
particular, failure to recognize that government deficits and net private
investment are identically equal to changes in the stock of government
bonds and capital is important because neglecting all types of links with
what happens after the "short run" horizon of T years, any stabilization
policy is given a patent of myopia.
Then in order to take care of this deficiency a "long run" economy
characterized by continuous full employment, perfectly competitive markets,
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instantaneous adjustments, is defined so that the target of the short run
stabilization policy is the output that would be produced if the economy
were in this ideal situation. But there are many full employment-full
capacity utilization paths that the planner can choose and around which
stabilizes the short run economy. Each of these paths, among other things,
describes different combinations of investment and consumption, and within
the second of social and private consumption. A path optimal in the sense
of maximizing (32) is chosen; in order to be able to drive the economy
to this optimal path the C.P.B. has to implement certain policies that
are assumed to be different from those required to stabilize aggregate demand
in the short run economy. The C.P.B. then faces a choice: either to use
an undistinguished aggregate defined government expenditure to stabilize
the economy and delaying desired "reforms" when full employment is
achieved, or to adopt immediately a set of policies having the characteristic
of being more selective in the sense of producing the desired combination
of private and social consumption--what has been loosely defined as "reforms."
It is shown that if the first possibility is followed, the problem
of short run stabilization will always be present and "reforms" will never
be accomplished. On the other hand if the second alternative is followed,
implementation of the long run policies will not result in a short run
explosive behavior and will actually produce a long run state optimal not
only in the sense of being at full employment, but of being there having
accomplished the necessary "reforms."
The final question concerns the plausibility of our previous assumptions
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concerning the planner's behavior. Why should short run and long run po-
licies be different? Why was the C.P.B. constrained to choose between
short run stabilization and long run reforms? Why not achieve them at the
same time?
To achieve simultaneously both targets the C.P.B. has to know
present and future response of private investments to policy actions; in
particular, since the situation considered is one of unemployment,
at the initial time he has to know how current and future excess supplies will
be allocated between private consumption and private net capital formation.
On the other hand, if the C.P.B. follows the procedure outlined in section
(4) of the paper, the only necessary information is the initial full
employment, full capacity utilization capital-labor ratio, on whose basis
optimal policies are computed. Whatever are the decisions taken by the
private sector they will be constrained by these policies to be consistent
with both full employment and desired reforms. Surely there will be no
guarantee that these policies will minimize the frequency and/or the amplitude
of short run oscillations, but they will always be successful in driving
the system to full employment on the optimal path.
These assumptions reflect some rational behavior in the sense
of minimizing the informational requirement needed by the planner but of
further importance they seem to describe current behavior in many countries.
Appendix
Note I:
Z = Z + iB
P
Z = c + c + k + nk
p g
Z = - iBg =  d + xZ - iBg =  d + * - iBg
p p
(I.1)
(1.2)
(1.3)
where Z is per capita full employment personal GNP. Combination of (1.2)
P
and (1.3) gives the flow budget constraint (30).
Note II:
oo
Consider the term ny- in (48). Making use of the same transformation
as in Note I and evaluating (1') and (5") at the stationary state
-o 
-- do
(D - y )
r
--dco (g00 -n)
(-sy +I +g) r( - nBr B
Consider the other terms in the square brackets of (48'), they can be
shown to be equal to
2 y 2 g C o
ny =-nB + ng
(I + OnI) = anydo
CO
ny
A-2
doo doo
y cy = s dccf3 B
dOO doo
ny - cny
doo
= nsy
Then recognizing the fact that investment is identically equal to changes
in the capital stock and evaluating these changes at the steady state
do -- 2-
any = nk + n k
Then multiplying (48') by , dividing by r and eliminating offsetting terms
--doo --dco
sy + nsy = n(k + B ) + n 2 (k + Bg)
But differentiating twice with respect to time the portfolio equilibrium
condition 111.3 and evaluating it at the steady state, it can be seen that
Bnsy d n (k + Bg0)
and expression (48") is obtained.
Note III:
D- u=y (III.1)
where u is an exogenously given constant. Then using 1.3
y =--d + x - iB
d * g -D = y + x -iB - u
Substituting this expression into (1') and remembering that investment
(II.1)
~-nrrpmarurrerr~ aiI*i~iilY~lllsB*-LZ~
A- 3
is identically equal to changes in the capital stock
d -d * -*
y -cy - g k + nk - x + iB + u (111.2)
111.2 with the government budget constraint (5") and the definition
of consumption will give
S -
B-g + nB = (-c - (k + nk) - u(1- s) p (111.3)
then subtracting this from (38')
s -S+n(B -B) + (-k) + n(k - k) (c -cs uB ) + n( 1- sCp- p
which is expression (50).
~ i--rrrs~co~~a*i~~
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